State Domination in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman and Turkish state is generally described as a prime example of a strong, unitary state capable of unilaterally imposing its order and rules on society. It is viewed as a sovereign body that is largely impermeable to social demands, and presented as the main  and perhaps only  instigator and actor in the processes of “modernisation” and “westernisation” that affected nineteenth-century society. 

Vue d’Istanbul

View of Istanbul. Galata's bridge, Topkapi's palace, Bleu Mosque Bleue and Hagia Sophia.

Vue de la Mosquée Bleue, à Istanbul

Blue Mosque, in Istanbul.

But several elements suggest we need to relinquish any such vision. Observation of the transactions involving state officials brings out the significant scope of initiatives by local notables seeking to oppose state institutions or else come to arrangements with them. In addition to this, numerous non-institutional actors have been involved in producing and implementing policy. Lastly, institutions have been exposed to initiatives by political parties seeking to exploit them for their own advantage. 

These three aspects suggest we should do away with the idea of a dichotomy between state and society, and instead pay attention to the overlaps that may be observed between social, political, and state spheres. Such analysis results in a picture of a state largely deprived of autonomy, what Joel S. Migdal has called a “state in society” with numerous points of social anchorage. 

La place Emin-Onou et Yeni Djami

Emin-Onou and Yeni Djami's Square, in Constantinople (around 1895).

The state tradition and modernisation in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey

Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper  taking as their starting point the approach first set out by Barrington Moore in his analysis of the social origins of dictatorship and democracy – put forward an interpretation of Ottoman and Turkish social configurations that runs counter to Moore’s thesis1 . For Mardin, the Ottoman Empire never went through the processes that led to the formation of the modern western state. In particular, it never experienced the many “confrontations [observable in England and France] leading to compromises with what may be called the forces of periphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers and later, industrial labour”2 . On this basis he puts forward the idea that has come to dominate Turkish political science and sociology, namely that the split between the centre and the periphery forms the dominant line of fracture running through Ottoman and Turkish society. Heper uses the supposed absence of any “tradition of multiple confrontation acting as a way to resolve conflicts” to conclude that “the Turkish Republic seems to have inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong state and a weak civil society”, and that “the opening up of the system in that polity brought face to face neither different socio-economic groups nor a central authority and rather intransigent estates but a dominating state and a not-well-organized periphery”3 . 

La Liberté sauvée

“Saved Freedom”. Lithograph celebrating Yourg Turks’ Revolt in 1908 and the reintroduction of the Ottoman Constitution on 1876, 23 November. 

This idea of some kind of “face-off” between the state and social elites is clearly problematic, for it takes the interests and authority of the former as antithetical to those of the latter, without this ever being empirically proven. It has nevertheless been taken up by numerous authors, such as Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, who argue that in the shift from the empire to the republic “the Young Turks and Kemalists […] were the heirs to the old patrimonial tradition which assumed the dominance of the state over civil society and reserved the monopoly of legitimacy and authority to state elites, at the expense of social and economic elites”4 . It is clearly the case that the formation of the Ottoman state, as observed from the “centre”, was a process in which the Sultan’s power was asserted over social forces that might contest his authority. But this vision of the relationship between state officials and economic and social forces as dichotomous has encouraged historiography to view normative texts and speeches solely for signs indicating that the state did indeed dominate society  which may be one reason that the phantasmal image of Ottoman “Oriental despotism” has survived in the literature. 

 

Le sultan et premier calife Ottoman Selim Ier, vers 1500

The Sultan and the first Ottoman Caliph Selim I, around 1500.

Another set of works, whilst sharing this idea of an autonomous and dominant state, departs from the broad interpretive framework put forward by Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper in postulating that the “modern” state was imported to Anatolia due to the determination of a westernised elite within the Kemalist party-state, who oversaw the adoption of legal codes and regulations borrowed from European states5 .The dominant historiography up until the 1990s viewed the single-party Kemalist regime (1923-1945) as a further phase in the process of modernisation initiated in the previous century by the Ottoman Empire, which had been unable to fully carry out its programme of reforms. From this perspective the Tanzimat finally came to fruition in Kemalism6 . The most emblematic social and political reforms of the early years of the republican period –  secularity”, language and alphabet reform, the adoption of western dress, women’s suffrage, etc.  – have thus been studied in terms of modernisation7 . From this perspective the prime object of study is the emergence and implementation of public policy. Clerical resistance and ethnic and nationalist protest are presented as reactionary in that they were opposed to modernity, that is to say the formation of a nation-state along European lines8

 

 

It is as if Turkey had progressed towards “modernity” along a linear course, under the aegis of some supposed west European model9 . According to such a view, the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms (Tanzimat) were an attempt to rationalise government by importing techniques devised elsewhere. The first Ottoman Constitution, promulgated in 1876, is said to have resulted from the (inevitably delayed) influence of European Enlightenment ideas and the importation of contractualist thought10 . And the transformation of the country into a republican nation-state, the systematic overhaul of policy instruments (such as censuses and legal codes), and the adoption of new cultural practices (the Latin alphabet, the wearing of hats, the consumption of alcohol, the dropping of the “Caesaropapist” tradition, the modernisation of techniques11 , etc.) is viewed as stemming from the determination of westernised elites as well as from contingent contacts with certain European populations12 . Feroz Ahmad thus asserts that “the Kemalists wanted to see Turkey transformed into a modern nation state which, in the words of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), ‘would live as an advanced and civilised nation in the midst of contemporary civilisation’. Such a nation would have to be secular and rational, emphasising science and modern education in order to create a modern industrial economy”13 . 

La Sublime Porte.
Le discours d’Ankara de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
Le président Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Bursa, in 1924.

President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (at the forefront) and Prime Minister İsmet İnönü (left) are leaving the Turkish Parlement during the 7th anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic, in 1930. 

These authors, being attentive to the ways in which a western model of state was imported, tend to consider any specificities observable in the concrete practices of government as indicating a mismatch with the imported norm, postulating this norm’s superiority over the form actually taken in Turkey. Such a developmentalist paradigm has come in for severe criticism. Erik Jan Zürcher argues that the modernising action of the regime needs to downplayed. At least up until 1945, the apparatus of state only had a limited presence within society, especially in rural areas14 . Furthermore, this approach based on laws and institutions tends to focus on one actor of change--the state--and on an essentially top-down process15 . Social actors are thus placed in the position of recipients of change and modelled along binary lines, being either Kemalist or reactionary, modernist or conservative.

The role played by notables in channelling state domination

The idea of an external, despotic central state under the Ottoman Empire needs to be put into proper perspective, as does that which views the Kemalists’ modernising project as a reaffirmation of state structures. As Marc Aymes argues, “it is not certain that the history of the Ottoman Empire, as seen from the province, […] be the sole preserve of a (state) centre imposing its role. […] Ottoman governmentality is not simply a matter of the framework of administrative compromises, but also mobilises other registers of social relations, other experiences, and other expectations”16 . This is also what Albert Hourani and Philip Khoury emphasise in their “notables policy” paradigm, which reveals the key role of social elites in the daily functioning of the Ottoman regime, especially as intermediaries between the government and the population17 . Suraiya Faroqhi has shown how, as of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the Sultan’s subjects did not passively submit to the Porte’s decisions, but rather launched “political initiatives” enabling them to expand their room for manoeuvre by offering resistance, circumventing regulations, or brokering agreements18 . Following on from Joel Migdal and “state-in-societies studies”, Reşat Kasaba – in a paper about social change in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century – shows how the Tanzimat reforms may be viewed as enabling state institutions to accommodate non-Muslim social groups19 . These studies of the mediation processes in which state and non-state officials competed and brokered arrangements suggest that protagonists in official arenas were often just one set of players amongst others in the socio-political contest. They also show that these protagonists, rather than being dominant actors as depicted in certain state-centred works, were in fact exposed to the unexpected effects of their hegemonic ambitions20 . 

 

Michael Meeker, for his part, rather than splitting social elites from state personnel, argues in terms of a “non-official state system”21 . He describes how a “regional social oligarchy of imperial origin” flourished within or on coming into contact with public institutions. Meeker’s work thus shows how local Anatolian elites penetrated the state system as the Ottoman state progressively extended its control over the provinces. His work also suggests that it was by dint of their anchorage in local societies that protagonists in official arenas were granted the authority they claimed to exert. These local elites were able to adapt and diversify their positions in the central and provincial state system in the nineteenth century when measures were adopted to strengthen central government. If we agree with Meeker’s conclusions, it may be held that rather than some dichotomy opposing the state to social, economic, or religious “elites”, there were in fact “regional social oligarchies” who “negotiated and oversaw the incorporation of areas within the fold of the state”, while pursuing tactics to penetrate the provincial and central state system22 . Thus local notables (merchants, landowners, etc.) found ways to entrench their social and economic positions by working with or against state representatives in the imperial administration. Jane Hathaway analyses a similar process in Cairo, showing how ambitious local figures sought to obtain the favours of the imperial central authorities by joining the households of imperial civil servants, who, for their part, sought to penetrate the households of local notables by placing their clients in them23 . These intersecting initiatives resulted in the creation of a provincial Ottoman state system that Hathaway assimilates to an “administrative hybrid”. 

What is in fact needed is to move away from a zero-sum model. The interactions between state sectors and social groups could very well result in the strengthening (or weakening) of both parties. Work by Ariel Salzmann on the post-1695 institution of long-lease tax farming (malikâne) shows how important a role this played in the evolution of the Ottoman provincial administrative system24 . The tax farming system and delegation of territorial management enabled social and economic elites with sufficient resources to purchase these leases to strengthen their positions, whilst also ensuring the Treasury regularly received sizeable advance payments. The new contract bound a labour force to the state without formally expanding the Istanbul bureaucracy, at the same time as it enabled the state to extend the power of its fiscal patronage. The interpenetration of state institutions and their environment thus needs to be thought of in terms of interdependency, agreements, and collusion, as well as competition, resistance, and circumventions. 

This observation still holds good after the shift to a republic. During the period of the Kemalist party-state, despite the regime’s theoretical distrust of notables, power continued to be based on local notabilities which provided a means of exerting authority remotely. For Mardin, “a sizable portion of the provincial, notable class was successfully co-opted into the ranks of the Republican People’s Party. This compromise did not differ radically from what prevailed at the time of the Young Turks, or even earlier”25 . Notables who accepted to enter into an alliance with the Kemalists in the wake of the War of Independence (1918-1922) were appointed to the regime’s political and administrative institutions. This provided them with the means to strengthen their local power positions, whilst endowing the regime with the means needed to win local recognition for its legitimacy. As Cemil Koçak has observed, “especially in areas of the country where a feudal agricultural structure prevailed, wealthy landowners were consistently sitting in Parliament as MPs. In particular, the leaders of the Kurdish clans in the eastern and south-eastern areas, who had positive and close relations with headquarters, easily entered and were able to remain in Parliament”26 . There was an informal pact between the government and Kurdish landowning notabilities in the south-eastern provinces, who were granted official functions and in local party positions in exchange for switching to the regime27 . Sections of the single party were soon monopolised throughout the country by merchant and landowning notabilities who thereby acquired positions of power and accumulation.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's discourse in Ankara, for the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, October, 23, 1933.   

The co-production of public policy

Observation of policy production in Turkey also leads us to break with the idea of a state that functioned as a unitary and autonomous bureaucratic whole, imposing its order and rules on “formless”, unorganised peripheries. Various non-institutional actors played a direct part in devising and implementing reforms, working in networks composed of civil servants, party leaders, notables, tribal and clan groups, various associations (professional, cultural, etc.), and trade unions. Furthermore, state representatives ran into resistance and regularly failed in their undertakings due to the inadequate means at their disposal or opposition from populations. 

The most emblematic reforms of the “Kemalist revolution” were thus only able to acquire a degree of legitimacy by affiliating representatives from the sectors targeted. Nathalie Clayer has shown how the secularisation policy, far from being imposed in authoritarian manner, was in fact negotiated with various actors in the religious field. New religious institutions set up by the regime, rather than being straightforward instruments of power, were in fact forums for negotiating and jointly producing public policy28 . The government knowledge needed to draw up and implement reforms obliged the regime to obtain the services of scholars and men of science. Particularly illustrative examples of this are provided in Emmanuel Szurek’s work looking at language reform (the change of alphabet, adoption of the Latin script, Turkification of grammar, purging of vocabulary, and introduction of countless neologisms) and the organ driving this process, the Turkish Language Institute (Türk Dil Kurumu)29 . By giving due place to the many agents involved in the linguistic policy conducted by the Kemalist regime, Szurek shows how dense interactions in Kemalist Turkey were between scholars, politicians, and the single party. 

Such recent research brings out how public institutions were intimately bound up with local society during the single-party period. It places the idea that a new order was systematically imposed by the Kemalist party-state in proper perspective. Thus Murat Metinsoy analyses the numerous reports drawn up by MPs to inform central administrations of their constituents’ discontent and demands. Metinsoy emphasises how these reports enabled the state and single party to compensate for the fragile nature of their hegemony. In the absence of direct citizen participation, they provided a means of mediation, leading Metinsoy to view the republican state as a flexible authoritarian regime solidly embedded within society30

The regime regularly delegated certain sectors of public policy, such as public order. During the second half of the nineteenth century, a police force was established in urban areas, drawing on the support of paid hoodlums, organised gangs, and militia capable of enforcing order31 . Sultan Abdülhamid II set up the Hamidiye, tribal regiments operating in Southeast Anatolia, to win over certain Kurdish tribes as allies of the state, which then delegated certain of its prerogatives to them32 . A century later, in the 1980s, when the war against the PKK was escalating, the public authorities once again drew on civilian support, setting up village militias in the Kurdish regions – the village protectors (Köy Korucusu) – so as to bolster their counter-insurgency strategy. Periods when violence was comparatively centralised--the single-party period being one of them--gave way to others when violence was delegated to intermediaries capable of standing in for state institutions33 . All in all, the history of the late Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey is comprised of a web of fluctuating configurations in the way state and non-state, political and economic, bureaucratic and party political, legal and illegal, “modern” and “traditional” sectors all overlapped and became interpenetrated. 

Political parties in the state

With the establishment of a single-party regime, and subsequent legalisation of opposition groups after the Second World War, political parties became key vectors via which social forces could appropriate state positions and resources. As of the instigation of the republic in 1923, government parties consistently placed their political personnel and activists in institutions. This enabled them to appropriate public resources that they then distributed to their partners and supporters34 . Such activities to capture public resources were the prime means of accumulation for political parties35 . The longstanding centralisation of social and economic resources within the state sphere, particularly during the period when there was a command economy (1923-1980), explains why parties tended to establish a presence in the state, thus becoming genuine intermediaries for actors in the social and economic sphere36 . 

Up until 1980 Turkey implemented protectionist economic policies based on massive state intervention. This development strategy influenced the means of capital accumulation, and was a factor in the emergence and development of large economic groups with close ties to government. Ayşe Güneş-Ayata notes that in a society with scarce resources in which the state plays a fundamental role in allocating resources, certain classes and social groups use clientelism as a participatory strategy to set up a closed system of allocation that works to their benefit37 . Such practices to capture public resources and positions enabled parties to negotiate political support and privilege their business and trade union partners in given sectors. Intervening in procedures to appoint public employees or workers in public companies provided a powerful means of remunerating electoral clienteles, enabling parties to draw on the support needed for their political activities while controlling the institutions they targeted. The presence of supporters in state institutions was also an advantage at election time, for activists working in the public sector could draw on state resources to mobilise their party’s electorate. Furthermore, once in power political parties could alter the law, enabling them to reinforce or marginalise other actors (be they political parties, public sector workers, or businesses).

These practices were also a factor in the lack of autonomy of public institutions, which were unable to establish the rules to function correctly, or even to control who they recruited. This had several effects on the political system. First, institutions could not be neutralised, for the state was the prize at stake in political contest. Parties in Turkey did not just intervene in the procedures to appoint public sector employees, they expected employees to support the government via the way they carried out their job on a daily basis. They thereby replaced the laws and regulations applying to public-sector recruitment with party-political modes of certification and routes to employment. The way political parties exerted control over certain state sectors thus led to the politicisation of institutions, and was a factor in turning the state as a whole into an arena for conflict38

 

Party control of certain state institutions led to their de-objectification. This process may be seen both in the practices of public employees and the representations the public had of them. The politicisation of public employees’ professional practices led the public to adapt to what they viewed as the political biases of the administration, and to employ tactics in their contact with the administration--by adopting distinctive signs displaying their belonging to a political or religious movement, for instance39 . The state apparatus as a whole thus underwent what may be described as a loss of objectification. Social relationships within the state in which state representatives were caught up were thereby shorn of their externality and impersonality, characteristics which were no longer taken for granted. 

Finally, the appropriation of the state by political parties encouraged the army to enter the political field. The army is sometimes viewed as an “external” institution that can stabilise a political system incapable of regulating itself. The military evoked this role in protecting the integrity of the state, as conferred on it by three successive constitutions (of 1924, 1961, and 1982), in the wake of each coup (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997). But the hypothesis that the army is external to the system glosses over the fact that its modus operandi may be seen as stemming from the lack of state neutrality. The army, like other state institutions, has been subject to the influence of party-political rationales. Some of its sectors have also undergone processes of politicisation, being exposed to political initiatives driven by the dominant party and government, and hence on occasions opposed to it. In fact the military institution would appear to exist in a state of permanent tension between, on the one hand, factions participating in the governing parties’ networks of collusion, and, on the other, factions for which a coup represents a way of wresting (or maintaining) control over the military institution while simultaneously asserting its political autonomy. But whilst the army has, like other public institutions, been exposed to party-political initiatives seeking to establish an influential presence in the state field, it has nevertheless enjoyed the requisite coercive resources to protect itself from such initiatives, and to alter the political game to its own advantage40 . 

 

Manifestants occupent les bâtiments de la place Taksim

Demonstrators occupying buildings on Taksim's Square, in Istanbul, during the protests of June, 5 2013. 

Recent historical study of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey from the nineteenth through to the twenty-first century has moved decisively away from the picture of a strong state clearly differentiated from society. Instead, it has revealed the multiple positions and shared interests of actors. This turns the state into a set of positions to be conquered, generating possibilities for accumulating resources that may be reconverted in other arenas. In the light of this body of historical research, we need to abandon classical interpretations of the state as a differentiated organ, an intentional, unified entity endowed with the resources needed to impose its order on a disorganised society. Any such idea tends to overlook the very low degree of institutionalisation of state roles, and to deny the mechanisms of devolution and discontinuity occurring throughout the late modern history of the Turkish state. Any idea of the externality of state and social elites must be firmly ruled out, as must the widespread idea that the republican state has deliberately worked to destroy traditional structures. The multiple straddling practices observed mean that the state sphere can no longer be viewed as a body existing outside society. 

 

Unfold notes and references
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1

Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966.

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2

Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?”, Daedalus, n° 102, 1973, p. 170.

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3

Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, Northgate, The Eothen Press, 1985, p. 149, 16.

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4

Ali Kazancıgil, Ergun Özbudun, Atatürk. Founder of a Modern State, London, C. Hurst and Company, 1981, p. 48.

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5

Paul Dumont, Mustafa Kemal invente la Turquie moderne, Brussels, Complexe, 1983 [new ed. 1997 and 2006].

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6

Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal, McGill University Press, 1964; Stanford Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II, Reform, Revolution, and Republic. The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808­1975, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

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7

Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society. Modernizing the Middle East, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1958; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London-Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1961; Suna, Kili, Atatürk Devrimi. Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli [Atatürk’s Revolution. A Model of Modernisation], Istanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011.

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8

Hamilton A. R. Gibb, Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West. A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1957; Peter Mansfield, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1973.

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9

Walter F. Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey. From Ataturk to the Present Day, New York-London, Holmes and Meier, 1981; Craig C. Hansen, “Are We Doing Theory Ethnocentrically ? A Comparison of Modernization Theory and Kemalism”, Journal of Developing Societies, vol. 5, n° 2, 1989, p. 175-187.

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10

For discussion of the influence of the Enlightenment, see Şerif Mardin, “L’influence de la Révolution française sur l’Empire ottoman”, Revue internationale des sciences sociales, n° 119, 1989, p. 26-33. For the importation of contractualist thought, see Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2000.

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11

Donald Quataert, Manufacturing and Technology Transfer in the Ottoman Empire 1800-1914, Istanbul, Isis Press, 1995.

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12

Arnold Reisman, Turkey’s Modernization. Refugees from Nazism and Ataturk’s Vision, Washington D.C., New Academia Publishing, 2006.

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13

Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 53.

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14

Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey. A Modern History [1993], London-New York, I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 41-53.

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15

Olivier Bouquet, “Is It Time to Stop Speaking about Ottoman Modernization?”, in M. Aymes, B. Gourisse, É. Massicard (eds.), Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century, Leiden, Brill, 2015, p. 47.

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16

Marc Aymes, “Provincialiser l’empire”, Annales. HSS, 62nd year, no. 6, 2007, p. 1328.

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17

Albert Hourani, “Ottoman reforms and the politics of notables”, in W. R. Polk, R. L. Chambers (ed.), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East. The Nineteenth Century, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 41-68; Philip S. Khoury, “The urban notables paradigm revisited”, Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, n° 55-56, 1990, p. 215-228.

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18

Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Initiatives ‘From the Bottom Up’ in the Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for Their Existence”, in H. G. Majer (ed.), Osmanistiche Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. In Memoriam Vanco Boskov, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrasowitz, 1986, p. 24-33; Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Tensions in the Anatolian Countryside around 1600: An Attempt at Interpretation”, in J.-L. Bacqué-Gramont, B. Flemming, M. Gökberk, I. Ortayli (eds.), Türkische Miszellen. Robert Anhegger Festschrift, Istanbul, Divit, 1987, p. 116-130; Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic Legitimation (1570-1650)”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, no. 35, 1992, p. 1-39; Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), Political Initiatives “from the bottom up” in the Ottoman Empire [proceedings of Halcyon Days in Crete VII, 9-11 January 2009], Rethymno, Crete University Press, 2012.

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19

Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988; Reşat Kasaba, “A Time and a Place for the Nonstate: Social Change in the Ottoman Empire during the Long Nineteenth Century”, in J. S. Migdal, A. Kohli, V. Shue (eds.), State, Power and Social Forces. Domination and Transformation in the Third World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 207-230.

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20

For discussion of rivalry and arrangements in Turkey, see in particular Yael Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State. Secularism and Public Life in Turkey, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002. For discussion of the hegemonic ambition of official protagonists, see Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, American Political Science Review, vol. 85, n° 1, 1991, p. 77-96; Veena Das, Deborah Poole, “State and its Margins: Comparative Ethnographies”, in V. Das, D. Poole (eds.) Anthropology in the Margins of the State, Santa Fe, School of American Research Press, 2004, p. 6-34.

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21

Michael E. Meeker, A Nation of Empire. The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity, Berkeley-Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2002, p. XXI.

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22

Jean-François Bayart, L’État en Afrique. La politique du ventre, Paris, Fayard, 2006, p. 272.

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23

Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt. The Rise of the Qazdaḡlıs, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 24.

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24

Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire. Rival Paths to the Modern State, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2004, p. 87-88.

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25

Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?”, Daedalus, n° 102, 1973, p. 182.

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26

Cemil Koçak, “Parliament Membership during the Single-Party System in Turkey (1925-1945)”, European Journal of Turkish Studies, n° 3, 2005, § 37 (available online: http://ejts.revues.org/497).

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27

Berk Esen, “Nation Building, Party-Strength, and Regime Consolidation: Kemalism in Comparative Perspective”, Turkish Studies, vol. 15, n° 4, p. 608.

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28

Nathalie Clayer, “An Imposed or Negociated Laiklik? The Administration of the Teaching of Islam in Single-Party Turkey”, in M. Aymes, B. Gourisse, É. Massicard (eds.), Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century, Leiden, Brill, 2015, p. 97-120.

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29

Emmanuel Szurek, Gouverner par les mots. Une histoire linguistique de la Turquie nationaliste, PhD. thesis, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2013.

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30

Murat Metinsoy, “Fragile Hegemony, Flexible Authoritarianism, and Governing from Below: Politicians' Reports in Early Republican Turkey”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 43, n° 4, 2011, p. 699-719. See too: Yiğit Akın, “Reconsidering state, party and society in early republican Turkey: politics of petitioning”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, n° 3, 2007, p. 435-457; Catherine Alexander, Personal States. Making connections between people and bureaucracy in Turkey, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 2002.

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31

Noémi Lévy-Aksu, Ordre et désordres dans l’Istanbul ottomane (1879-1909), Paris, Karthala, 2012.

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32

Gilles Dorronsoro, “Les politiques ottomane et républicaine au Kurdistan à partir de la comparaison des milices Hamidiye et korucu: modèles institutionnels, retribalisation et dynamique des conflits”, European Journal of Turkish Studies, no. 5, 2006, § 1 (available online: https://ejts.revues.org/778); Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire. Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011.

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33

Hamit Bozarslan, “Le phénomène milicien: une composante de la violence politique en Turquie des années 70”, Turcica, n° 31, 1999, p. 185-244.

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34

Gilles Dorronsoro, Benjamin Gourisse, “Une clé de lecture du politique en Turquie: les rapports État-partis”, Politix, n° 107, 2015, p. 195-218.

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35

For a study of party activity to penetrate the State during the 1970s, see Benjamin Gourisse, “Party Penetration of the State: the Nationalist Action Party in the late 1970s”, in É. Massicard, N. Watts (eds.), Negotiating Political Power in Turkey. Breaking up the Party, London, Routledge, 2012, p. 118-139.

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See in particular Zafer Toprak, Türkiye'de Ekonomi ve Toplum (1908-1950). Milli Iktisat - Milli Burjuvazi [Economy and society in Turkey (1908-1950). National economy, national bourgeoisie], Istanbul, Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayınları, 1995; Şevket Pamuk, “Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey”, MERIP Reports, n° 93, 1981, p. 26-32.

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37

Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, “Class and Clientelism in the Republican People’s Party” in A. Finkel, N. Sirman (eds.), Turkish State, Turkish Society, London, Routledge, 1990, p. 181. For discussion of the clientalist transactions binding political parties to local actors, see too: Ergun Özbudun, “Turkey: the Politics of Clientelism” in S. Eisenstadt, R. Lemarchand (eds.), Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1981, p. 249-268; Horst Unbehaun, Klientelismus und Politische Partizipation in der Ländlichen Türkei. Der Kreis Datça 1923-1992, Hambourg, Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts, 1994, p. 249-268.

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38

For a study of this issue applied to the Turkish police during the 1970s, see Benjamin Gourisse, “Pluralité des rapports aux normes professionnelles et politisation des pratiques dans la police turque des années 1970”, European Journal of Turkish Studies, n° 8, 2008 (available online: http://ejts.revues.org/index2273.html).

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39

Benoît Fliche, “Éléments pour une trichologie turque”, in M.-F. Auzépy, J. Cornette (eds.), Histoire du poil, Paris, Belin, 2011, p. 211-233.

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40

The army’s capacity to safeguard its autonomy by conducting a coup has however been seriously curbed since the AKP came to power in 2002. The AKP has taken up the country’s EU accession project, enabling it to progressively sideline the Army. The wave of reforms associated with Turkey’s application to join the EU, as well as the demands of international sponsors and the International Monetary Fund, have played a significant role in reducing the military’s positions within the political system.

Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, Londres, Routledge, 1993.

Antonis Anastasopoulos (dir.), Political Initiatives ‘from the bottom up’ in the Ottoman Empire [Actes des Halcyon Days in Crete VII, 9-11 janvier 2009], Réthymnon, Crete University Press, 2012.

Yiğit Akın, “Reconsidering State, Party and Society in early Republican Turkey : politics of petitioning”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 39, n° 3, 2007, p. 435-457. 

Catherine Alexander, Personal States. Making Connections between People and Bureaucracy in Turkey, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Marc Aymes, “Provincialiser l'empire”, Annales. HSS, 62e année n° 6, 2007, p. 1313-1344.

Jean-François Bayart, L’État en Afrique. La politique du ventre, Paris, Fayard, 2006.

Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal, McGill University Press, 1964.

Olivier Bouquet, “Faut-il encore parler de modernisation ottomane ?”, in M. Aymes, B. Gourisse, É. Massicard (dir.), L’Art de l’État en Turquie. Arrangements de l’action publique de la fin de l’Empire ottoman à nos jours, Paris, Karthala, 2014, p. 53-74.

Hamit Bozarslan, “Le phénomène milicien : une composante de la violence politique en Turquie des années 70”, Turcica, n° 31, 1999, p. 185-244.

Nathalie Clayer, “Un laiklik imposé ou négocié ? L’administration de l’enseignement de l’islam dans la Turquie du parti unique”, in M. Aymes, B. Gourisse, É. Massicard (dir.), L’Art de l’État en Turquie. Arrangements de l’action publique de la fin de l’Empire ottoman à nos jours, Paris, Karthala, 2014, p. 103-126.

Veena Das, Deborah Poole, “State and its Margins: Comparative Ethnographies”, in V. Das, D. Poole (dir.), Anthropology in the Margins of the State, Santa Fe, School of American Research Press, 2004, p. 6-34.

Gilles Dorronsoro, “Les politiques ottomane et républicaine au Kurdistan à partir de la comparaison des milices Hamidiye et korucu : modèles institutionnels, retribalisation et dynamique des conflits”, European Journal of Turkish Studies, n° 5, 2006, § 1 (en ligne :  https://ejts.revues.org/778). 

Gilles Dorronsoro, Benjamin Gourisse, “Une clés de lecture du politique en Turquie : les rapports État-partis”, Politix, n° 107, 2015, p. 195-218.

Paul Dumont, Mustafa Kemal invente la Turquie moderne, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1983 [nouv. éd. 1997 et 2006].

Berk Esen, « Nation Building, Party-Strength, and Regime Consolidation : Kemalism in Comparative Perspective », Turkish Studies, vol. 15, n° 4, p. 600-620.

Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Initiatives “From the Bottom Up” in the Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire : Some Evidence for Their Existence”, in H. G. Majer (dir.), Osmanistiche Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. In Memoriam Vanco Boskov, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrasowitz, 1986, p. 24-33.

Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Tensions in the Anatolian Countryside around 1600 : An Attempt at Interpretation”, in J.-L. Bacqué-Gramont, B. Flemming, M. Gökberk, I. Ortayli (dir.), Türkische Miszellen. Robert Anhegger Festschrift, Istanbul, Divit, 1987, p. 116-130.

Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic Legitimation (1570-1650)”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, n° 35, 1992, p. 1-39.

Benoît Fliche, “Éléments pour une trichologie turque”, in M.-F. Auzépy, J. Cornette (dir.), Histoire du poil, Paris, Belin, 2011, p. 211-233.

Hamilton A. R. Gibb, Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West. A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1957.

Benjamin Gourisse, “Pluralité des rapports aux normes professionnelles et politisation des pratiques dans la police turque des années 1970”, European Journal of Turkish Studies, n° 8, 2008 (en ligne : http://ejts.revues.org/index2273.html). 

Benjamin Gourisse, “Party Penetration of the State : the Nationalist Action Party in the late 1970s”, in É. Massicard, N. Watts (dir.), Negotiating Political Power in Turkey. Breaking up the Party, Londres, Routledge, 2012, p. 118-139.

Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, “Class and Clientelism in the Republican People’s Party” in A. Finkel, N. Sirman (dir.), Turkish State, Turkish Society, London, Routledge, 1990, p. 181.

Craig C. Hansen, “Are We Doing Theory Ethnocentrically ? A Comparison of Modernization Theory and Kemalism”, Journal of Developing Societies, vol. 5, n° 2, 1989, p. 175-187.

Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt. The Rise of the Qazdaḡlıs, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, Northgate, The Eothen Press, 1985.

Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reforms and the Politics of Notables”, in W. R. Polk, R. L. Chambers (dir.), Beginnings of modernization in the Middle East. The Nineteenth Century, Chicago-Londres, The University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 41-68.

Ali Kazancıgil, Ergun Özbudun, Atatürk. Founder of a Modern State, Londres, C. Hurst and Company, 1981.

Reşat Kasaba, “A Time and a Place for the Nonstate : Social Change in the Ottoman Empire during the Long Nineteenth Century”, in J. S. Migdal, A. Kohli, V. Shue (dir.), State, Power and Social Forces. Domination and Transformation in the Third World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 207-230.

Philip S. Khoury, “The Urban Notables Paradigm Revisited”, Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, n° 55-56, 1990, p. 215-228.

Suna, Kili, Atatürk Devrimi. Bir Çağdaşlaşma Modeli [La Révolution d’Atatürk. Un modèle de modernisation], Istanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011.

Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire. Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011.

Cemil Koçak, “Parliament Membership during the Single-Party System in Turkey (1925-1945)”, European Journal of Turkish Studies, n° 3, 2005 (en ligne : http://ejts.revues.org/497).

Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society. Modernizing the Middle East, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1958.

Noémi Lévy-Aksu, Ordre et désordres dans l’Istanbul ottomane (1879-1909), Paris, Karthala, 2012.

Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Londres-Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1961.

Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?”, Daedalus, n° 102, 1973, p. 169-190.

Şerif Mardin, “L’influence de la Révolution française sur l’Empire ottoman”, Revue internationale des sciences sociales, n° 119, 1989, p. 26-33.

Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2000.

Peter Mansfield, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1973.

Michael E. Meeker, A Nation of Empire. The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity, Berkeley-Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2002.

Murat Metinsoy, “Fragile Hegemony, Flexible Authoritarianism, and Governing from Below: Politicians' Reports in Early Republican Turkey”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 43, n° 4, 2011, p. 699-719.

Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988.

Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”, American Political Science Review, vol. 85, n° 1, 1991, p. 77-96.

Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966.

Yael Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State. Secularism and Public Life in Turkey, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.

Ergun Özbudun, “Turkey : the Politics of Clientelism” in S. Eisenstadt, R. Lemarchand (dir.), Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1981, p. 249-268.

Şevket Pamuk, “Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey”, MERIP Reports, n° 93, 1981, p. 26-32.

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Horst Unbehaun, Klientelismus und Politische Partizipation in der Ländlichen Türkei. Der Kreis Datça 1923-1992, Hambourg, Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts, 1994.

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Une collection de contenus sélectionnée sur Politika

Public Sphere in Modern Societies

Since the eighteen century, the public-private distinction has structured our societies. While in the private sphere, the individual builds a relationship to himself and develops as unique being, in the public sphere, the different social actors voice their opinions about what should be the general interest and thus contribute to building the notion of the common good.

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Doing Social Sciences

Guided by a few intuitions and armed with their reflexivity, social scientists build their objects, elaborate investigative devices and interpret the field data. Thus, the scientific approach contributes to a better understading of our world.

Une collection de contenus sélectionnée sur Politika

From the Ottoman Empire to Contemporary Turkey

Turkey has been, since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s authoritarian drift, at the heart of the key issues affecting, both the national and international marketplace. The Entries presented here raise the question of the relationship to power in a long-term perspective. They highlight the role played by different social actors such as the State, the local notables, etc., in the process of modernisation as well as the ways of channelling the state domination yesterday and today.