The Right to Secession in the Kenyan Context: Philosophical Reflections, with Special Reference to Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups

Introduction

Secession is the formal withdrawal from an established, widely recognised state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state. Thus the decision to secede represents an instance of political disintegration, in which the citizens of a sub-system withdraw their political activities from the central government to focus them on a centre of their own1 . A rare variety of secession is the consensual one, which results either from a negotiated agreement between the state and the secessionists (as occurred when Norway seceded from Sweden in 1905), or through constitutional processes (as the Quebecois are pursuing in the Supreme Court of Canada)2 . In contrast to secession, if the part of the state which challenges its unity includes the central government and lays claim to the legal identity of the existing state, we have a case of expulsion rather than secession3 . Secession is also different from partition, in which a single territory is divided into two. Thus the so-called British India was partitioned into independent India and independent Pakistan along religious lines in 1947, with the predominantly Hindu and Sikh areas assigned to India and the predominantly Muslim ones to Pakistan. This was in sharp contrast to the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971.

Several elements are necessary for a secession crisis, among them an identifiable unit of people or “distinct community”4 , territory, leaders, and discontent5 . The discontent is usually due to the marginalisation of a group from the political and economic life of a state6 . Furthermore, a precondition for the emergence of secessionist movements is nationalism7 , which is usually understood to be devotion to the culture and interests of one’s ethnic group, with the ultimate aim of achieving statehood for it. Thus successful secessionist bids result in new states. One indicator of the significance of the question of secession to politics and scholarship is the fact that the various independence movements in Africa and Asia in the mid twentieth century were secessionist bids, as their aim was to form new states in territories that were previously under the hegemony of Western imperial powers. Mainly as a result of those movements, the number of independent states increased fourfold over the twentieth century8 Secessionist movements in post-colonial African states often insist that there is no essential difference between their struggles for independence and the struggles that were waged to free colonial territories from Western imperialism, because in both cases there is a group of people desiring political autonomy from a state that they consider to be oppressive.

The desire for secession by many non-dominant ethnic groups9 around the world is often triggered or fuelled by violations of such fundamental rights as due process, freedom from discrimination, and personal liberty and security9 . However, states that claim to be democratic often violently thwart secessionist bids, and receive support for their actions from a substantial number of members of the community of independent states10 . In Africa, some of the most well-known secessionist flashpoints are Katanga, Biafra, Southern Sudan, Eritrea, and the Somali regions of Kenya and Ethiopia.

Kenya has had its own share of public discourse on secession going back to the eve of its independence. Kenyan Somalis made an unsuccessful secessionist bid for most of the 1960s. Besides, at certain crucial conflictual points in the country’s history, other ethnic groups have suggested that they might opt for secession to secure their interests. For example, soon after the 2002 elections in which the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) resoundingly defeated the Kenya African National Union (KANU), a number of Kalenjin members of Parliament declared that they would secede if the new government continued to “discriminate” them in key public appointments11 . More recently, there have been calls for secession at the Kenyan coast, led by the Mombasa Republican Council. Similarly, after the disputed 2017 elections, some of the members of ethnic groups allied to the National Super Alliance (NASA) repeatedly used various public gatherings and social media platforms to call for secession, to which the Jubilee government responded with threats to unleash the state’s legal and coercive machinery to crush any efforts to challenge the territorial integrity of the country. The government’s military action against the Somali secessionist bid in the 1960s, its threat of stun legal action against the Kalenjin M.P.s who called for secession in the wake of the defeat of KANU in 2002, and its belligerent responses to the Mombasa Republican Council and the NASA secessionist agitations indicate its probable responses to any future secessionist bids12 .

On 16th March 2016, the renowned Kenyan economist, David Ndii, wrote a newspaper article titled “Kenya is a Cruel Marriage: It’s Time We Talk Divorce”13 . In it he argued that in view of the deep-seated dissatisfaction among various ethnic groups and clusters of ethnic groups occasioned by ethnicised politics from the dawn of the country’s independence to date, it is preferable that they be allowed to exit the Kenyan state peacefully instead of waiting until the outbreak of a genocidal civil war. The article sparked a vigorous debate in various mass media and social media platforms in Kenya. However, as expected of a newspaper article, it did not delve into the philosophical issues around the question of secession. Twenty years earlier, a Kenyan lawyer, Ahmed Nasir Abdullahi, treated the question of secession from a scholarly and legal point of view, but took a largely pragmatic approach, thereby leaving several philosophical concerns regarding the issue unattended14 .

In view of the foregoing observations, in this article, I undertake philosophical reflection on the question as to whether or not there are circumstances in which disgruntled ethnic groups in Kenya may be morally justified to launch secessionist bids. However, I pay special attention to the plight of non-dominant ethnic groups in the country such as the Suba, Teso, Ogiek, Il Chamus, Endorois, Sirikwa, Il-Molo, and Mukogodo. Some of my readers will naturally want to know why I am focusing on ethnic groups. This particular concern is normally informed by the ethnically-blind Western liberal vision of society which asserts that the interests of the individual, rather than those of his or her cultural or religious group, ought to be the focus of public discourse. According to Crowley16 , this aversion for the recognition of ethnic identities is perhaps most strikingly enacted in France, where mention of ethnic categories encounters deep suspicion, and where it is widely - though by no means universally - held that the ideal of citizenship prohibits, on normative grounds, the use of ethnic categories in social-science inquiry, even for the most trivial empirical purposes. Nevertheless, as I explain in the sub-sections on “National Self-Determination Theories of Secession” and “Remedial Right Theories of Secession” below, many Kenyans do not subscribe to that vision of society, but instead have a communalist outlook which considers their ethnic groups to be extensions of their families.

The purpose of this article is not to advocate for or against secession in Kenya, or anywhere else in the world for that matter. Rather, I proceed from an appreciation of the fact that secession is often an extremely emotive issue, and as such desperately requires a rational approach from both sides of the debate. I therefore hope that this article will give my readers an opportunity to reflect on the moral implications of secession without the rancour which usually accompanies debates on the issue in the political sphere.

In what follows, I set out by clarifying the concept of “non-dominant ethnic groups” within the Kenyan context. I then assess the applicability of the three main Western philosophical theories of secession (choice, national self-determination, and remedial right)17 to the Kenyan context. I go on to argue that a more plausible justification for the right of secession may be found in a purely teleological approach to it, that is, by determining the balance of benefits and losses to those aspiring for secession. I conclude with an appeal for wholehearted efforts to address the grievances of non-dominant ethnic groups in Kenya in a bid to forestall secessionist bids and secessionist wars.

Conceptualising “Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups” and “Ethnic Identity” in the Kenyan Context

Orange river, by Ivan Bandura

In Western scholarship, the discourse on inter-group relations is often cast in terms of majorities and minorities. Thus Francesco Capotorti, former Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, proposed the following definition of a minority:

A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State, possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language 18 .

Certainly, Capotorti’s definition above takes cognisance of the fact that a minority need not be ethnic, as it can be religious or linguistic. Of interest to my purpose here is that his observation that a group’s numerical disadvantage can lead to it having a non-dominant status in a society also implies that other factors quite apart from numerical disadvantage can produce the same effect. Indeed, not all numerically disadvantaged ethnic groups suffer domination from their majority counterparts, and some actually dominate them. Thus the Boers of South Africa, who are a tiny fraction of that country’s population, enjoyed a dominant political and economic status during the Apartheid era, and continue to enjoy economic dominance more than two decades after its formal end. This fact justifies my use of “non-dominant ethnic groups” rather than “minority ethnic groups” in the Kenyan context, as it covers a wider range of disadvantaged ethnic groups, whether their disadvantage is due to historical, numerical or economic factors. In fact, some of the ethnic groups in the country that have perpetually failed to capture political power and the attendant economic advantage are relatively numerous, as are the Luhya cluster of ethnic groups, the Kamba, and the Luo.

In line with the Western framework of viewing inter-group relations, Yash Ghai asserts that ethnic groups can be defined by their political aims: “They are content to be called minorities if their aspirations do not extend beyond special linguistic or educational or religious facilities. They proclaim their ethnicity if the goal is some form of autonomy. Further along the line, they may designate themselves ‘nation’ or ‘nationality’ if they aim to set up a separate state of their own.”19 Nevertheless, Ghai goes on to caution that the utility of these distinctions is doubtful since there is an easy progression from one to another. Furthermore, as Crowley cautions20 , in each country, the notion of an ethnic minority, even when used routinely, reflects a complex and distinctive history of political debate, conceptualisation and administrative codification.

Although my focus in this article is the possible right of secession by non-dominant ethnic groups in Kenya, there is no consensus among scholars concerning the distinguishing features of an ethnic group21 . For instance, while language is often seen as an indicator of ethnic identity22 , there is no agreement among linguists on the difference between languages and dialects23 . The situation is aggravated by the fact that politicians often define ethnicity according to expediency24 . Nevertheless, scholars widely agree that ethnic groups are complex and contested social constructions, perpetually in the process of creation25 . However, Schermerhorn26 seems to capture the essential features of the concept when he defines an ethnic group as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood.

For the purpose of this article, I define an ethnic group as a collectivity of people who share a common history, conceptual and material culture, and who see themselves as distinct from all other collectivities of people organised on the basis of similar criteria. Such a collectivity is not an immutable entity, but rather the result of social and economic forces, and is therefore subject to change over time. Nevertheless, members of an ethnic group often view their community as an enduring entity that enriches their lives and is therefore worth their loyalty. It is worth noting early in this article that loyalty to one’s ethnic group usually goes hand in hand with a communalist worldview, and is therefore at variance with a liberal outlook. Whereas liberalism is centered on the individual, an ethnic group is centered on the idea of community, and it discourages its members from claiming rights that would jeopardize group aspirations. Thus within an ethnic group, individuals are not “sovereign” or “morally autonomous” as is the case in a liberal framework, but instead gain rights and deserve defence only as active members of the community27 . In line with this communalistic outlook, many Kenyans view themselves as belonging to specific ethnic groups, and the country’s political life is dominated by ethnicity, giving rise to discontent among non-dominant ethnic groups.

In the pre-colonial era in the geographical area now designated as Kenya, there was no central inter-ethnic organ which could be exploited by one ethnic group to the disadvantage of other ethnic groups28 . However, with the advent of British colonialism towards the close of the nineteenth century, the various ethnic groups in the territory were forced into a single administrative unit with a divide-and-rule policy that aggravated inter-ethnic competition which continues to be the hallmark of contemporary Kenyan politics29 . It is also worth noting that the longstanding official number of Kenyan ethnic groups as forty-two is quite arbitrary, having been arrived at by the British colonialists out of expediency. Thus several of the communities listed are actually clusters of ethnic groups: the sixteen communities known corporately as “Luhya”, the nine groups collectively designated “Mijikenda”, and the approximately eight jointly referred to as “Kalenjin” are all cases in point30 .

According to the 1989 Kenya National Population Census, the largest Kenyan ethnic groups were the Kikuyu (21%), Luhya (14%), Luo (12%), Kalenjin (12%), and Kamba (11%). These groups made up about 70% of the country’s population. Other significantly large groups were the Kisii (6%), Meru (5%), and the Mijikenda (5%). These three groups accounted for only 16% of the country’s population. Together, the eight groups constituted about 86% of the population. Thus none of the groups was numerically large enough to dominate the others on the basis of population size alone. The remaining thirty-four groups made up about 14% of the population, and, individually, many were less than 1% of the country’s population. These included the Elmolo, Malakote, Ogiek, Sanye, and Waata, among others31 .

During a visit to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics on 29th September 2005, I was informed that due to ethnic sensitivities in the country, the Government decided to refrain from publishing the findings of the 1999 Population Census32 disaggregated by ethnicity. That decision was typical of Kenyan regimes over the past five-and-a-half decades, that have consistently denied the reality of politicized ethnicity, while they themselves vigorously pursue ethnicised politics in practice33 . Furthermore, the 1999 census was more politicized than the preceding ones, so that it would have been difficult to ascertain the accuracy of data disaggregated by ethnic groups34 .

The findings of the 2009 Kenyan National Population Census indicated that while the five largest ethnic groups generally maintained their numerical supremacy (except for the Luo who were displaced from the third position by the Kalenjin), ethnic groups such as the Elmolo, Malakote, Ogiek, Sanye and Waata continued to be grossly numerically disadvantaged35 . Even among ethnic minorities, some are more disadvantaged than others. Thus the Elmolo, whose total population is less than a thousand persons, are evidently more disadvantaged than the Il Chamus, whose population is several thousands, enabling them to have greater influence in the polity than the Elmolo.

Finally, some remarks about my use of the phrases “ethnic identity” and “ethnic group identity” are in order. In traditional Western philosophy, the term “identity”, from the Latin identitas (“sameness”), is understood to be the relation each thing bears only to itself. According to that view, identity is often thought of in terms of the distinguishing characteristics of an individual living or non-living being, in line with Gottfried Leibniz, who held that x is the same as y if and only if every predicate true of x is true of y as well. In view of the fact that ethnicity is a social construction, this view would find the phrase “ethnic identity” problematic.

Nevertheless, a distinction has developed between the Western philosophical meaning of “identity” and its social denotation. Thus in socio-political discourse, it is now conventional to speak of “national identity”, “ethnic identity”, “professional identity”, among others, not to denote an absolute category, but simply a constructed notion of a group’s distinctive characteristics, but one which is important to the group. Consequently, the term “identity politics” has now gained currency in socio-political discourse wide enough for the prestigious Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to publish an article on it, which explains that “Rather than organizing solely around belief systems, programmatic manifestos, or party affiliation, identity political formations typically aim to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context. Members of that constituency assert or reclaim ways of understanding their distinctiveness that challenge dominant oppressive characterizations, with the goal of greater self-determination”36 .

Identity politics is alive among ethnic groups in Kenya. For example, while the British colonisers had characterised the Bantu-speaking Suba as “Luo-Abasuba”, the Suba themselves are keen to emphasise that they are not Luo, but rather Suba. Similarly, while the Kalenjin majorities in the Rift Valley have sought to downplay the cultural distinctives of the hunter-gathering Ogiek, the community insists that it is a separate people, and the Endorois and Il Chamus, also living among the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley, are responding in similar fashion, even insisting on separate representation in the country’s legislative bodies. In like manner, the Nilotic Teso in Western Kenya vigorously assert their distinctiveness from the Bantu-speaking Luhya communities. In the area around Mount Kenya, the Embu and Meru, for whom the British colonisers printed the Bible and school textbooks in Gikuyu, are insisting that they are distinct from the more numerous Kikuyu. As Lentz predicted37 , in the years to come, ethnicity, in whatever concrete forms and under whatever name, would be so important a political resource and an idiom for creating community, that social scientists and anthropologists had no choice but to confront it: I opine that this imperative equally applies to political philosophers38 .

Moral justifications for The Right of Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Kenya to Secede

A number of Western writers classify philosophical theories of the right to secede into three, namely, choice, national self-determination and remedial right39 . In what follows, I set out by critically examining these three broad theories, before proposing that a purely teleological justification for secession is more applicable to the contemporary Kenyan context than the three theories.

Choice Theories of Secession

Choice theories of the right to secede are founded on Western liberal democratic thought, with its emphasis on the autonomy of the individual and the importance of arriving at collective decisions through a majoritarian mechanism. Thus Beran contends that in view of the value liberalism places on freedom, popular sovereignty and legitimate majority rule, liberal political philosophy requires that secession be permitted if it is effectively desired by a territorially concentrated group within a state and is morally and practically possible40 . On this view, there is a close relationship between democracy and the right to secession: both are legitimated by the importance of people making decisions about the institutional structure of the society in which they live41 .

However, some theorists argue that in view of the fact that secession affects all the citizens of a polity, the question of independence for a territory whose residents aspire for secession ought to be put, in referendum, not only to the population in the said territory, but also to that of the country as a whole42 . Nevertheless, proponents of choice theory could reply that such a referendum would render the exercise meaningless, as its outcome would be skewed against the numerically disadvantaged section of the citizenry wishing to secede.

Another standard objection to choice theories of secession maintains that the entrenchment of a plebiscitary right to secede in international law and practice would have a number of undesirable consequences: it would lead to a proliferation of secessionist crises and of the outbreaks of violence and war that sometimes result from such crises. It would also allegedly create perverse incentives for existing states, including an incentive to avoid otherwise beneficial schemes of regional autonomy and federalism where such schemes raise the probability that secessionists would be able to organize and win a referendum on independence. In addition, it is argued, a plebiscitary right to secession would undermine the practice of democracy by making exit too easy, thereby discouraging the exercise of legitimate agitation for reform within established states43 . In short, the recognition of such a right, it is argued, would result in anarchy.

Nevertheless, some proponents of choice theories contend that what little evidence there is on secession does not support the anarchist objection. They point out that Norway seceded from Sweden in 1905, Iceland from Denmark in 1944, and Singapore from Malaysia in 196544 , but these secessions were not followed by further secessions from the newly independent states or the parent states. As Beran45 contends, people do not disrupt the unity of an existing state lightly, especially if it is not in their self-interest and if the grievances which may make secession appealing to them are dealt with fairly and sympathetically. Beran also points out that political separation at one level can go hand in hand with economic and political integration at another. Going by Beran’s reasoning, a group such as Kenyan Somalis in the north-eastern part of the country could secede from Kenya, but as a new polity or as part of Somalia, join the East African Community of which Kenya is a member. Such a move would probably jeopardise the welfare of Kenyan Somalis living in other parts of the country, but some of them might even take the view that their ancestral region would be conducive to their relocation after the secession.

Furthermore, as Buchanan46 correctly noted, going by the anarchist objection to the right to secession, one might just as well say that we ought not to acknowledge the moral ideal of personal autonomy, because if we do people will run amok, committing all sorts of atrocities in its name. For him, the saner approach is to admit that this moral ideal, like all others, can be abused, and then set about the task of determining the scope and limits of the ideal in its implications for how one ought to act, and ensuring that the ideal is embodied in institutions in such a way that its proper scope and limits will be duly observed in the main. Buchanan further points out that the anarchist objection seems to be oblivious to the fact that secession is now a widespread idea that has found concrete expression in many movements47 .

Of great relevance to the task of this article is the observation of Moore that because choice theorists tend to conceive of secession as justified in terms of the right of the individual to make decisions touching on his or her welfare purely as an individual, they ignore entirely the ethnic or ascriptive character of many secessionist movements48 . Moore contends that this understanding of secession as simply an extended form of individual freedom fails to explain the territorial claims that these groups make. Choice theories of the right to secession can therefore not adequately account for the highly communalistic claims that inspire the secessionist bids of non-dominant ethnic groups in Kenya such as the Kenyan Somalis and the ethnic groups on the country’s coast.

Paysage bleu

National Self-Determination Theories of Secession

These theories suggest that world peace would be greatly enhanced if culturally homogenous groups (“nations”) were allowed to form states of their own. It is associated with a series of speeches given by the former American president, Woodrow Wilson, between 1918 and 191950 . Wilson’s assumption seemed to have been that acknowledging the claims of self-determination was a simple corollary of respect for democracy, and contemporary secessionists, and many who write and theorize about secession, share his intuition about this51 .

However, Lynch is of the view that an examination of Woodrow Wilson’s concept of national self-determination in light of both Wilson’s own intellectual development and the evolution of wartime strategy and diplomacy, establishes that there was no prior consideration of ethnic or collective versus liberal or civic nationalism in Wilson’s idea of “national” self-determination52 . Lynch further urges that the actual enunciation and application of the principle was deeply affected by considerations of wartime strategy and diplomacy. Nevertheless, for a century now, many politicians and scholars have been greatly influenced by the more conventional interpretation of Wilson’s view, which understands him to have advocated that for the sake of world peace, culturally homogenous groups be allowed to form states of their own53 . This Wilsonian perspective is what Buchanan refers to as “the normative nationalist principle”54 . In the Kenyan context, this view would assert that the culturally homogenous groups that we now refer to as “ethnic groups” are actually “nations” with the right to exit the culturally plural Kenyan state and to form states of their own.

Following the conventional interpretation of Wilson’s view, some contemporary thinkers argue that non-dominant ethnic groups in any polity, being different from the rest of the population, have an equal right to a separate identity and existence55 . The ideal conception of a liberal democracy, which Kenya has aspired to since its political independence in 1963, is that in an election, the majority win and the minority lose, and due to the dynamism of individual voters’ opinions, no one is outvoted all the time. However, the reality is that gross numerical differentiation among ethnic groups in a single state means that some groups do regularly lose electoral battles56 . Consequently, a number of contemporary thinkers urge that it is necessary to recognise the right of such groups to secede. Thus Patten57 contends that the recognition of ethnic group identity is a “good” for individuals in two different ways. First, it allows individuals to fulfil their aspiration to participate in collective self-government alongside members of the group with which they identify, and, second, it promotes the value of communal integrity.

However, critics contend that the concept of “peoplehood”, central to the Wilsonian idea of self-determination, is a fuzzy one, as there is no consensus on what kind of group comprises a people58 . In this regard, Ivor Jennings famously commented: “On the surface it seem[s] (sic) reasonable: let the people decide. It [is] in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are.”59

What is more, a people is presumably a distinct ethnic group, some of the identifying marks of which are a common language, shared traditions, and a common material culture. However, each of these criteria has its own difficulties. For example, what count as different dialects of the same language and what count as distinct languages raise complex theoretical and metatheoretical issues in linguistics60 . Besides, the histories of many groups exhibit frequent discontinuities, infusions of new cultural elements from outside, and alternating degrees of assimilation to and separation from other groups61 . In addition, Allen Buchanan asserts that if the number of cultural groups or peoples is not fixed but may increase, the principle of national self-determination is a recipe for limitless political fragmentation62 . However, a proponent of secession could reply that the transience of ethnic identity is not the exclusive preserve of culturally homogenous polities, but is also true of multi-ethnic states. This is why the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the British Empire, and the United Soviet Socialist Republics no longer exist.

Furthermore, on the conventional Wilsonian interpretation of who the “peoples” are that are entitled to be self-determining, the ethnic identity of a “people” defines where the boundaries ought to be drawn. However, on the hegemonic Western liberal democratic civic conception of peoples as majorities within accepted political units, a view greatly popularised by the United Nations, the answer to the territorial question defines who counts as “the people”. Critics point out that in many cases, the two conceptions do not coincide, and the possibility of conflict is very real. For example, Moore observes that the principle of national self-determination is unproblematic only in the ideal case that the administrative boundary coincides with the ethnic group: the group is territorially concentrated, with no significant minorities; and the members of the group are strongly mobilized in favour of secession63 . Moore points out that most cases fall far short of that ideal, although Iceland is the rare exception, in which both definitions of “people” (those resident in the administrative boundaries of the unit, and those who are members of the ethnic group) coincide.

Moreover, there is the question of the minimum size of a territory and the minimum size of a culturally homogenous group eligible for secession. For Wellman while individuals and small groups may not secede, a larger group may, provided it is of sufficient size to perform satisfactorily the functions necessary for a state to legitimize its claim to territory64 . However, Philpott sees no reason why a city or tiny region cannot be self-determining: “Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Hong Kong are all doing just fine.”65 Nevertheless, Philpott insists that a neighbourhood or family are more dubious candidates for secession, because there are certain functions which any independent state must perform: maintain its roads and utilities, educate its children, preserve minimal domestic order, and provide basic public goods.

Perhaps the most plausible objection to the Wilsonian right to self-determination is the number of ethnic groups claiming statehood versus the availability of land on which they can form their own states. For example, African states are home to over a thousand ethnic groups with disparate cultural, social, economic and political orientations66 . Kenya has forty-two ethnic groups according to the colonial categorisation, and over seventy when we consider that the Luhya, Kalenjin and Miji Kenda are umbrella terms for the sixteen, eight and nine distinct ethnic groups respectively, and these three are not the only colonially-inspired misrepresentations, as the case of the Mukogodo illustrates67 . Going by the conventional interpretation of the Wilsonian outlook, each of these groups is entitled to form its own state – an evident impracticability.

It therefore seems necessary to identify a more pragmatic criterion for determining which ethnic groups are morally entitled to secession, and the criterion that readily suggests itself is the need for a group to escape sustained gross systemic injustice, that is, secession as a remedial right, to which we now turn.

Remedial Right Theories of Secession

Remedial right theories, also called “just cause theories”, shift the emphasis from an absolute right to national self-determination to relative legal amelioration and the means used to achieve redress to wrongs committed on a group. These theories are firmly located within the evolving practices, in the global arena, of universalism, and the increasing number of conventions dealing with human rights principles68 . On Buchanan’s version of the remedial right only position, injustices capable of generating a right to secede consist of persistent violations of human rights, including the right to participate in democratic governance, and the unjust taking of the territory in question, if that territory was previously a legitimate state or a portion of one69 . However, for Seymour, the injustices sufficient to warrant a secessionist bid do not merely relate to the violation of human rights, to the annexation of territories or to the violation of previous intrastate autonomy arrangements, but also to a failure on the part of a state to comply with principles such as fair representation and internal self-determination70 .

One of the most well-known remedial right arguments for secession, and one which strikes resonance with non-dominant ethnic groups in Kenya, is the need to redress historical injustice. This is what Buchanan refers to as “The argument from rectificatory justice”71 . This argument can be advanced by “a group that was once invaded, annexed, or robbed of its land through diplomatic subterfuge and continues, through literature, stories handed down, and the brave acts of dissidents, to tend the memory of its glorious, innocent, free, untrammelled past, staving off the homogenizing intentions of its oppressors”72

Annexation is usually based on conquest, and this is true of the territory on which British imperialism formed the Kenyan state. Indeed, the formation of the Kenyan state was an act of gross violence, commencing with the formal inauguration of the Imperial British East Africa Company rule in 1888, but more officially with the declaration of British East African Protectorate on 1st July, 189573 . An 1886 Anglo-German agreement had delineated the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar from the country’s coastline to ten miles into the interior74 . In 1895, the Sultan of Zanzibar leased the administration of the strip to the British. These events set in motion the forceful process of placing different ethnic communities with their diverse systems of government within one large and new area of central administration75 . The territory beyond the ten-mile coastal strip was declared to be “Kenya Colony” in 192076 . Thus while the ten-mile coastal strip continued to be referred to as a Protectorate, the rest of the territory was henceforth referred to as the Kenya Colony77 . Nevertheless, the British administered the Protectorate and the Colony as a two-in-one unit out of expediency78 .

Furthermore, at its founding in 1963, the Organisation of African Unity committed itself to respecting the borders set by the Western colonial powers, thereby setting its seal of approval on the dismantling of the indigenous socio-political formations occasioned by the notorious Berlin conferences of the late nineteenth century. Thus through the actions of those who claimed to be champions of decolonisation, Africa remains defined by Western imperialism rather than by the preferences of her peoples. As Serumaga succinctly put it, “The Westphalian principles, rooted in the 1648 Treaties signed in the European region of that name, have been monstrously mis-applied when it comes to the African continent, yet they established modern international relations, particularly the inviolability of borders and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states.”79 Consequently, since various ethnic groups in present-day Kenya had their own independent polities before the British imperialist incursions into the territory, they could argue with John Locke that any government formed as a result of conquest is not legitimate80 .

Moreover, even before the British imperialist invasion of present-day Kenya, a number of ethnic groups such as the Luo, Kisii, Meru, and Kikuyu immigrated into the territory a few centuries earlier, and overpowered numerically disadvantaged indigenous ethnic groups that they found there, such as the Ogiek, Il Chamus, Endorois, Sirikwa, Il-Molo, and Sengwer, annexing the lands on which they had lived. While the British colonisers subjugated these relatively recent arrivals along with the communities that they themselves had subdued, the recent arrivals continued to enjoy a much better status than the numerically disadvantaged communities that they had subdued in the pre-colonial era. This was due to the fact that the recent arrivals had much easier access to formal Western-type education, as well as to employment in settler farms and in the colonial bureaucracy, thereby gaining an early lead in the political and economic life of the colony and of the post-colonial state.

What is more, in the 1950s, the Swynnerton Plan sought to mitigate hostility against the colonial regime in Kenya by creating an African land-owning petty middle class driven by an imperative to protect its property81 , and this mainly benefited individuals from agrarian communities to the discomfiture of pastoralists and hunter-gatherers. Indeed, a hierarchy has developed in Kenya based on unequal political power which translates into unequal access to, and control over, land. From colonial times, alien Western capitalism has encroached on land, whether it belongs to agriculturalists, pastoralists or hunter-gatherers; agriculturalists have moved into pastoralist lands, and agriculturalists and pastoralists have taken over hunter-gatherer territories82 . Except for alien Western capitalist encroachment, numerical strength or weakness has been pivotal to this hierarchical process of socio-political dispossession, as the agriculturalists are more numerous than the pastoralists, and the latter have a demographic advantage over the hunter-gatherers83 .

In addition, according to a 2011 report of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), the five most numerous ethnic groups in Kenya (Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba and Luo) occupied nearly 70 percent of all government jobs. The Kikuyu led the pack with 22.3% of all civil service jobs, followed by the Kalenjin (16.7%), Luhya (11.3%), Kamba (9.7%) and Luo (9.0%). The Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, Luo, Kisii and Meru had a representation of above 5% in the civil service. All the other communities’ representation was below 5%. Two communities alone, the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, had a combined presence of almost 40% of civil service jobs, and the report inferred that this was due to the fact that each of them had held the presidency for more than twenty years84 . The NCIC published similar findings in its 2012 report85 . Furthermore, a 2018 report by the Kenya Human Rights Commission demonstrates that the allocation of cabinet positions from 1963 to 2018 has been heavily influenced by ethnic loyalty86 . A 2015 evaluation report of the Public Service Commission (PSC) corroborated the 2012 NCIC findings87 .

Uhuru Kenyatta’s first presidential term (2013-2017) was marked by the dominance of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, the two key groups in the Jubilee coalition, in cabinet and other key public appointments. Thus in mid January 2014, Kibiwott Koross wrote:

The home regions of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy William Ruto have been rewarded with more than half of all senior appointments, a survey by The Standard on Saturday has revealed. Mt Kenya and Rift Valley regions [Kikuyu and Kalenjin regions respectively] hold a combined 57.5% of the 87 appointments made by the nine-month-old Jubilee administration 88 .

In addition, during his first term, Uhuru Kenyatta was accused, in some instances more fairly than in others, of favouring the Kikuyu primarily, and the Kalenjin secondarily in, among others, appointments to key public offices generally89 , the perpetuation of the tradition of Kikuyu dominance in the appointment of Central Bank of Kenya governors90 , and appointments to heads of parastatal corporations91 . In the wake of Kenyatta’s 9th March 2018 rapprochement with Raila Odinga who had been his fierce competitor in both the 2013 and 2017 elections, we are seeing the Luo making a come-back into public appointments to the discomfiture of the Kalenjin. Yet all these manoeuvres mainly involve the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo elites, excluding the bulk of ethnic groups in the country.

Despite decades of political and economic exclusion based on ethnicity, the various ethnic groups that the British colonisers forcefully lumped together to form the Kenyan state are consistently urged to consider themselves to be Kenyans first, and to treat their ethnic identities as secondary. This message is packaged in a discourse that refers to Kenya as a “nation” or “nation-state”, suggesting a culturally homogeneous polity, contrary to the facts. However, as I have argued elsewhere, this conflation of nationhood and statehood in the discourse on post-colonial African states has resulted in the violation of the rights of non-dominant ethnic groups to meaningful political participation, equitable economic opportunities, ethnic identity, and secession, leading to an on-going lack of legitimacy in such polities, thereby exposing them to perpetual neo-colonial domination92 . This conflation is catalysed by the almost hegemonic status of liberal democracy, with its vision of ethnically-blind polities – a vision which seeks to disregard, if not erase, the fact that a large proportion of Kenyan masses are intensely loyal to their ethnic groups93 . Even among the middle class in Kenya, there is abundant evidence of ethnic loyalties. For example, in middle class members’ clubs, one finds tables informally but firmly designated for specific ethnic groups.

Historical injustice often results in a threat to the culture and even the very existence of vanquished groups, as is the case with numerous non-dominant ethnic groups in Kenya, including the Ogiek, Sengwer, Mukogodo, and Endorois95 . Remedial right theories hold that if a culture is endangered, its members have the right to secede. Similarly, a group threatened with genocide by the state or a third party against whom the state cannot defend it has a strengthened right to secede, just as a state, in just-war theory, has a right to self-defence96 . This outlook concurs with the view of Thomas Hobbes that individuals who make a covenant with a sovereign are not obligated to submit to the sovereign’s demands to the extent of giving up their right to life because the very purpose of the covenant was to preserve their lives97 .

Moreover, some of the ethnic groups in the marginalised parts of Kenya have suffered state-instigated gross human rights violations. For example, during the reign of Daniel arap Moi, over fifteen thousand Somalis were killed by Kenyan security forces in the former North-Eastern Province. Two outstanding massacres occurred in Garissa in 1980 and in Waggala in 198498 . Thus Abdullahi, himself a Kenyan Somali, argued that since the Kenyan Government had failed to manage the affairs of the state in a democratic and equitable manner, it was appropriate to reappraise the current form of the state, with a view to addressing the grievances of marginalised ethnic groups through secessionist self-determination99 .

Furthermore, historical injustice is usually characterised by discriminatory redistribution – the implementation by a government of taxation schemes, regulatory policies, or economic programs that systematically work to the disadvantage of a group, while benefiting others, in morally arbitrary ways. A state that persists in discriminatory redistribution has violated one of the fundamental conditions of its authority, namely, the requirement that it operate for the mutual advantage of all the stakeholders in it100 . Most ethnic groups agitating for secession cite discriminatory redistribution among their major grievances. Thus in May 2009, Calist Mwatela argued for the secession of Kenya’s then Coast Province on the basis that although the province was the greatest revenue contributor to the central government, it was getting a “raw deal” in the distribution of the country’s resources101 .

However, at least three objections to remedial right theories are worth considering in the Kenyan context.

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First, a critic could point out that it is difficult to arrive at objective standards by which to determine the point at which a non-dominant ethnic group is morally justified to launch a secessionist bid. This is because the disregard for group rights is a continuum from what may be viewed as mild contraventions to gross violations. What is more, those inside the group would probably be disposed to argue that the violations they have been subjected to justify secession, while those outside it are likely to contend that the group ought to explore alternative means by which to have their grievances addressed. This divergence of opinion is likely to culminate in the kind of deadlock that is the stuff of civil war.

Second, remedial right theories erroneously treat existing states as almost permanent entities from which groups can justifiably secede only in adverse circumstances. In this way, the theories fail to account for the fact that most existing states came into being through some kind of secession, and this is equally true of post-colonial African states as for many polities in Asia, the Americas, and Europe102 . In addition, even ethnic groups that have not suffered gross violations of their rights may wish to form states of their own for other reasons such as to preserve their cultural identities or to better run their public affairs: remedial right theories do not account for such aspirations.

Third and perhaps most plausible, a critic could point to the objection, earlier raised with regard to self-determination theories of secession, that the number of ethnic groups in Kenya is too large to afford viable territories for all those among them that may wish to secede. The critic could therefore assert that the more practicable solution to the concerns of such ethnic groups is constitutional and legal reforms. However, this would be a bitter pill for such groups to swallow, particularly due to the substantial difficulties of effecting the kind of constitutional and legal reforms that would adequately address their concerns. The fact that their concerns were not captured in the Constitution of Kenya 2010, promulgated forty-seven years after formal independence in 1963, highlights the magnitude of the difficulty.

Thus while remedial right theories constitute a more solid moral basis for the right of secession for non-dominant ethnic groups in Kenya than choice and national self-determination theories, it is necessary to look beyond them in search for an even more firm basis for this right, and this leads me to a consideration of a purely teleological basis for the moral justification for secession.

Teleological Justification for Secession

It could be argued that choice, national self-determination, and remedial right theories are all broadly teleological, in that they emphasise the purported favourable consequences of recognising the right of secession. However, a teleological perspective is broader than those three theories, and therefore worth reflecting upon on its own merits. Choice theories, as earlier pointed out, are based on Western liberalism’s ideology of thoroughgoing individualism which many Kenyans, with their traditional communalistic outlook, would find difficult to relate to. On the other hand, a national self-determination approach is impracticable, due to the large number of Kenyan ethnic groups as opposed to the landmass that they would be vying for. A remedial right approach is closer to the Kenyan socio-political reality, in that many non-dominant ethnic groups, many of them ethnic minorities, have suffered gross historical injustices and on-going marginalisation, all of which ought to be redressed on moral grounds. However, the majority ethnic groups control the executive, legislative and judicial processes needed for such reforms, and are therefore likely to frustrate efforts at such redress.

In sharp contrast to the foregoing three arguments for secession (choice, national self-determination, and remedial right), a teleological justification for secession is based purely on calculation of cost versus gain. Thus if a non-dominant group is confronted with overt or covert genocide through the action of the state under whose authority it currently lives, the teleological Hobbesian principle that the right to life cannot be transferred to a sovereign would lead to the conclusion that the group is morally justified to attempt to secede rather than submit to annihilation. If it arrives at this conclusion, it would be choosing the risk of war instead of the certainty of extermination. In the words of Philpott, “Secession […] truly becomes a last resort; it should be endorsed only when a people would remain exposed to great cruelty if left with a weaker form of self-determination.”103

Thus the purely teleological approach to secession would require a non-dominant ethnic group in Kenya considering the possibility of secession to realistically assess its prospects of success. In this regard, the group would need to bear in mind not only the military might of the state from which it wishes to secede, but also the overbearing influence of the community of independent states, which, by and large, is opposed to secessionist bids104 . Besides, it would have to carefully consider the ability of the new state to defend itself against aggression from its neighbours, including, not least, the state of which it was formerly a part. Nevertheless, this does not imply that in all cases the prognosis is defeat for the secessionist party; for as the case of Somaliland which has asserted its right to take back its sovereignty from Somalia illustrates, there are times when it is worth making a secessionist bid against all odds rather than resign to the debilitating conditions in a state that is either unwilling or incapable of protecting the vital interests of a community.

In my view, a purely teleological justification for secession is more plausible than the three theories of secession discussed above on at least three moral grounds.

First, a purely teleological approach to secession allows groups to claim a right to secede grounded in efficiency. This implies that rather than endure oppressive conditions in an unresponsive state, a group could secede and form a state of its own or merge with another state that better served it. Furthermore, the constant threat that a group might secede would exert market pressures on existing states to treat non-dominant groups with the decency they deserve105 .

Second, the teleologist can argue, as Walzer does, that there are three separate benefits associated with secession106 . First, nations can best guarantee their own safety when they possess the medium of sovereign power. Second, sovereign statehood provides the opportunity to organize political life according to the community's values. Third, nations aspiring to statehood on the first two grounds continue to disturb world peace as long as their aspirations are denied.

Third, as Abdullahi argued, due to the high cost of military force, it is prudent and humane to entrench the right of communities to secede into the constitutions of various African states, so that the process of secession is executed in an orderly manner107 . Abdullahi further contended that making secession a constitutional right in African states could herald the creation of a more protective human rights legal regime, in which the people rather than the rulers are in control108 .

However, several scholars have raised objections against the teleological argument for secession by presenting teleological arguments against it. Below I present five of these, along with rebuttals to them.

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First, Sunstein is of the view that whether or not secession might be justified as a matter of politics or morality, constitutions ought not to include a right to secede109 . For him, to place such a right in a founding document would increase the risks of ethnic and factional struggle, reduce the prospects for compromise and deliberation in government, raise dramatically the stakes of day-to-day political decisions, introduce irrelevant and illegitimate considerations into those decisions, create dangers of blackmail, strategic behaviour and exploitation; and, most generally, it would endanger the prospects for long-term self-governance. Furthermore, Sunstein argues that the opportunity for a negotiated agreement or a right of revolution would provide a remedy against most of the relevant abuses, without raising the continuous risks to self-government that would be created by a constitutional right to secede110 . Along similar lines, Buchanan contends that a plebiscitary right to secession would erode the conditions that make it rational for citizens to sustain a commitment to practice the virtues of deliberative democracy111 .

Nevertheless, views such as those of Sunstein and Buchanan above are more easily embraced by individuals who do not bear the brunt of state-driven marginalisation and oppression, and who therefore feel they have a substantial stake in the perpetuation of the existence of a state. However, those who, through the actions of the same state, suffer grinding poverty and the suppression of their right to free expression simply because of their ethnicity, would find it extremely difficult to identify with the purported benefits of sustaining the existence of such a state.

Second, a critic could point out that recognition of a constitutional right of secession would put any subunit whose resources are at the moment indispensable to the state, and which might be able to exist on its own, in an extraordinary position to obtain benefits or to diminish burdens on matters formally unrelated to its comparative advantage112 . Such threats were occasioned by the secessionist efforts of Katanga in Congo and Biafra in Nigeria, both provinces with a disproportionately high share of their states’ wealth113 . Nevertheless, in such instances, compensation may be an appropriate solution114 .

Third, critics contend that secession brings certain ills upon the larger state that more benign forms of self-determination do not: it more strongly restricts the larger state’s citizens, denying them opportunities for work, movement and change of residence that they previously enjoyed. In addition, by creating more states, especially adjacent hostile ones, secession increases cases of inter-state conflict115 .

However, the objection that secession results in increased limitations on the citizens of the original state rests on the false assumption that the original state has always existed, and would only be disrupted by the secessionist bid. The fact is that states are not perennial: they come into existence and go out of existence through the actions of men and women. Besides, the objection treats the existing state as a victim, when in fact its actions contributed significantly to the rise of the secessionist aspirations, whether those actions be the violence upon which the state was founded, or the exclusionist policies that it pursues.

Nevertheless, the objection that secession would increase inter-state conflicts demands serious attention because of some empirical data that seem to bear it out: The conflicts between Sudan and South Sudan, as well as the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in recent years, are cases in point. Yet there have also been numerous inter-state tensions that cannot be blamed on secession, such as those between Idi Amin’s Uganda and Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania in the late 1970s, Siad Barre’s Somalia and Mengistu Hailemariam’s Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s, and the current tensions between Yoweri Museveni’s Uganda and Paul Kagame’s Rwanda. As such, from a teleological point of view, the single concern of possible tensions between a newly seceded state and the polity to which it formerly belonged is not sufficient ground for dismissing the possibility of moral justification for secession.

Fourth, Spencer notes that secession damages interpersonal relations. In peacetime, many people regard their ethnicity as a matter of little significance116 . They may even change from one supposedly ascribed ethnic community to another several times during their lifetime, converting to a different religion or marrying out. In mixed marriages, a common way of avoiding friction is to evade the issue by refusing to identify oneself as belonging to either group. Secessionists, however, insist that everyone's ethnicity must be permanent and salient in social situations, thereby making it extremely difficult for people to preserve harmony in their homes. In such situations, inter-ethnic marriages typically break up or the families flee. The same must be said of interethnic friendships and business partnerships.

Nevertheless, the kind of tensions that Spencer is concerned about are very similar to those that inspire secessionist bids in the first place. As we noted in our discussion of remedial right theories of secession, secession is often seen as a cure for the tensions arising from the marginalisation of non-dominant ethnic groups; so we are not choosing between pre-secession peaceable co-existence and post-secession tension, but rather between the tensions of marginalisation within a state with discordant ethnic groups on the one hand, and the strained relations between two neighbouring states that were originally a single discordant one on the other. Besides, not all instances of secession have resulted in the kind of tensions that Spencer highlights: indeed, Spencer himself cites the cases of Norway and Sweden, Iceland and Denmark, as well as Singapore and Malaysia, all of which are doing just fine.

Fifth, critics point out that secession almost always produces new disadvantaged minorities who are oppressed and marginalised by the newly formed states117 . Indeed, quite often, there are cases in which dissenters and minorities live among the seceding group. A dissenter is one who belongs to the group, but does not agree on separation; a minority does not belong to the group at all, but lives in the group’s territory118 . Thus if most Kenyan Somalis in their native land of the North-Eastern part of the country were to support secession, the few Kenyan Somalis opposed to it would be dissenters, while any Gabras living in the territory would be a minority. However, I find it difficult to see how this particular problem could justify the continued marginalisation of some ethnic groups within existing states. It seems to me that it would be more plausible to get undertakings from dominant ethnic groups in a prospective new state to protect their non-dominant counterparts than to dismiss their secessionist bid offhand.

Conclusion

In the preceding reflections on moral justification for the right to secession in the Kenyan context, I have argued that in view of the fact that choice theories of secession are highly individualist in line with liberal democracy, they are largely alien to ethnic groups in Kenya, because such groups have a communalistic orientation. As for national self-determination theories of secession, I have found them untenable due to the limited landmass on which new states could be formed. I have further averred that although remedial right theories seem to be more pragmatic in the Kenyan context than choice and self-determination theories, it is difficult to arrive at objective standards by which to determine the point at which a non-dominant ethnic group is morally justified to launch a secessionist bid. Besides, adverse circumstances are not the only possible basis for the desire for secession: other considerations are also formidable candidates, including the desire to preserve a group’s cultural identity or to enhance the management of its public affairs. Consequently, I have argued that there may be adequate moral justification for secession by non-dominant ethnic groups in Kenya on purely teleological grounds. This is due to the fact that such an approach takes into consideration the issues that are the typical concern of remedial right theories, but goes beyond them to calculate the cost versus gain of a secessionist bid.

Nevertheless, it would be preferable for the Kenyan state to address the long-standing issues that cause discontentment among various ethnic groups in the country, thereby forestalling the costly eventuality of secessionist bids. Towards this end, scholars and politicians will need to go beyond the liberal democratic orthodoxy, with its ethnically-blind vision of society, in search of measures that can address the long-term grievances of various ethnic groups, thereby making the secessionist option less attractive to them. Such trail-blazing thought was evident in the call by Ojanga119 for a governance system fundamentally different from the parliamentary and presidential models, both of them liberal democratic in orientation, that Kenya has experimented with since her formal independence in 1963. A key plunk of his proposed model is the overt recognition of the need to cater for competing ethnic interests through a council of ethnic elders, with every ethnic group enjoying equal representation in the council, and with the council holding ultimate executive authority. While the details of his model are contestable, the essence of his proposal, that ethnic diversity be factored into the country’s socio-political engineering, deserves serious attention. On my part, I have argued for constitutional provisions to recognise and protect ethnic identities and interests120 . I have also argued for ethnically-based federalism to give ethnic groups or clusters of ethnic groups considerable latitude to organise their public life at the local level in a manner consistent with their worldviews, as this would considerably mitigate the effects of the British colonial disruption of indigenous political systems121 .

While the current geopolitics may give dominant ethnic groups in Kenya the impression that they can continue to marginalise their non-dominant counterparts for the foreseeable future, history teaches us that situations can change rapidly, culminating in scenarios that were hitherto difficult to conceive. The time to address the concerns of various ethnic groups in Kenya to forestall overwhelming secessionist bids may therefore not be as long as many may think.

Déplier la liste des notes et références
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1

Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 3.

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2

Allen Buchanan, “Secession”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017.

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3

Harry Beran, “A Liberal Theory of Secession”, Political Studies n° 32, March 1984, p. 21.

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4

My understanding is that the reference by Bartkus (The Dynamic of Secession, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 5.) to “an identifiable unit of people” or “distinct community” does not in any way suggest an immutable entity, but instead focuses on the way in which the members of such a community feel towards their group.

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5

Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 5.

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6

More on this under "Remedial Right Theories of Secession" below.

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7

Metta Spencer, Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

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8

Bruno Coppieters, "Introduction”, in Bruno Coppieters, Richard Sakwa (eds.), Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 1.

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9

I have clarified my use of the term “non-dominant ethnic groups” rather than “minority ethnic groups” in the next section titled “Conceptualising ‘Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups’ and ‘Ethnic Identity’ in the Kenyan Context”.

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9

Joshua Castellino, “Order and Justice: National Minorities and the Right to Secession”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, n° 6, 1999, p. 404-405.

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10

Reginald M. J. Oduor, Ethnic Minorities in Kenya’s Emerging Democracy: Philosophical Foundations of their Liberties and Limits. Ph.D. thesis at the University of Nairobi, 2011, p. 292-305.

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11

“Kenya: Opposition KANU party MPs threaten to declare Rift Valley a state”, BBC Report, February 23, 2003.

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12

To be fair, Kenya’s response to secessionist bids is not unique: many governments respond with overwhelming violence to such bids, as illustrated by the response of the U.S.A. to the secessionist bid of the Federal States (1861-1865), Congo to the Katangese secessionist bid (1960-1963), Nigeria to the Biafran secessionist bid (1967-1970), Various Ethiopian regimes to the Eritrean secessionist bid, Various Sudanese regimes to the long-drawn South Sudanese secessionist bid, and Spain’s responses to various secessionist bids over the years, among others.

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14

Ahmed Nasir M. Abdullahi, “Winding up the State: Why African States Should Legislate Secession as a Constitutional Right for Ethnic Nationalities”, in Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Kivutha Kibwana, Chris Maina Peter (eds.), Law and the Struggle for Democracy in East Africa, Nairobi, Claripress, 1996, p. 372-390.

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16

John Crowley, “The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 22 No.1, January 2001, p. 100.

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17

There is no consensus among Western scholars regarding the categorisation of theories of secession. For example, Allen Buchanan, a leading thinker in this field, has lately identified four main categories, namely, the right to secede as a right to territory, remedial right only theories, plebiscitary theories, and ascriptivist theories (Allen Buchanan, “Secession”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). However, in this article, I restrict myself to the three most widely discussed categories.

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19

Yash Ghai, "Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis"", in Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 7.

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20

John Crowley, “The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 22, No.1, January 2001, p. 100.

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21

See for examples: D. Okoth Okombo, “Language and Ethnic Identity: The Case of the Abasuba”. CEES Seminar Papers No.1, Presented at the Launching of the Faculty of Education, University of Nairobi, Staff/Student Seminars on 7th November, 1996;

 

Richard Jenkins, Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations, London, SAGE Publications, 1997;

 

James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Second Edition, London, Macmillan Press, 1998.

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22

See the last three paragraphs of this section for a clarification of my use of the phrase “ethnic identity”.

 

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23

Richard Jenkins, Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations, London, SAGE Publications, 1997; James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Second Edition, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998.

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24

Archie Mafeje, “The Ideology of ‘Tribalism,’” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1971, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 253-261.

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25

Gabrielle Lynch, “Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya”. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33 No. 107, March 2006, p. 50.

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26

Richard Schermerhorn,“Ethnicity and Minority Groups”, in John Hutchinson, Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 17.

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27

Stephen N. Ndegwa, “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics”. American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, 1997, p. 601.

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28

Lawrence M. Mute, “Minority Groups and the Constitutional Review Process”, in Lawrence M. Mute and Smokin Wanjala (eds.), When the Constitution Begins to Flower: Paradigms for Constitutional Change in Kenya, Volume 1, Nairobi, Claripress, 2002, p. 160;

 

Adams Oloo, “Minority Rights and Transition Politics”, in Peter Wanyande, Mary Omosa and Ludeki Chweya (eds.), Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya, Nairobi, University of Nairobi Press, 2007, p. 195.

 

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29

See Reginald M. J. Oduor, Ethnic Minorities in Kenya’s Emerging Democracy: Philosophical Foundations of their Liberties and Limits. Ph.D. thesis at the University of Nairobi, 2011, chapters 2 and 3.

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30

Reginald M. J. Oduor, Ethnic Minorities in Kenya’s Emerging Democracy: Philosophical Foundations of their Liberties and Limits. Ph.D. thesis at the University of Nairobi, 2011, p. 17, p. 161-162.

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31

Republic of Kenya, Kenya Population Census, 1989, Vol.1, Nairobi, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1994, Table 6-2.

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32

Republic of Kenya, The 1999 Population and Housing Census, Nairobi, Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2001.

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33

Walter O. Oyugi, “Ethnicity In The Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections In Kenya”, African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No.1, 1997, p. 41-69; "Ethnic Relations and the Democratisation Process in Kenya: 1990-1997", in Okwudiba Nnoli (ed.), Ethnic Conflict in Africa, Dakar, CODESRIA, 1998;

 

Stephen N. Ndegwa, “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, 1997; p. 599-616. ; “Kenya: Third Time Lucky?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3, July 2003, p. 145-158;

 

Michella Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat, London, Fourth Estate, 2009.

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34

Karuti Kanyinga, “Governance Institutions and Inequality in Kenya”, in Society for International Development, Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives, Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2006, p. 354.

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35

Republic of Kenya, The 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.

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36

Cressida Heyes, "Identity Politics", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition).

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37

Carola Lentz, “‘Tribalism’ and Ethnicity in Africa”, Cahiers des Sciences Humaines, Vol. 31 No. 2, 1995, p. 303.

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38

 “Liberal Democracy: An African Critique, South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 1, p. 108-122, 2019. For the crucial place of ethnicity in socio-political engineering in post-colonial African states, see, for examples, Claude Ake, “What is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa?Transformation No. 22, 1993; and Carola Lentz, “‘Tribalism’ and Ethnicity in Africa”, Cahiers des Sciences Humaines, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1995, p. 303-28.

 

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39

Margaret Moore, “Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession”, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 5.

Retour vers la note de texte 6846

40

Harry Beran, “A Liberal Theory of Secession”, Political Studies No. 32, March 1984, p. 21-23.

Retour vers la note de texte 6847

41

Margaret Moore, “Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession”, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 5.

Retour vers la note de texte 6848

42

Bruno Coppieters, “Conclusion: Just War Theory and the Ethics of Secession”, in Bruno Coppieters, Richard Sakwa (eds.), Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003b, p. 268-269.

Retour vers la note de texte 6849

43

Alan Patten, “Democratic Secession from a Multinational State”, Ethics, Vol. 112 No. 3, April 2002, p. 559; Philip Abbott, “Utopian Problem-Solving: ’The Great Divorce’ and the Secession Question”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 62 No. 2, May 2000, p. 517.

Retour vers la note de texte 7058

44

Metta Spencer, Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

Retour vers la note de texte 6850

45

Harry Beran, “A Liberal Theory of Secession”, Political Studies No. 32, March 1984, p. 29-30.

Retour vers la note de texte 6851

46

Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, Vol. 101 No. 2, January 1991, p. 322-342.

Retour vers la note de texte 6852

47

Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, Vol. 101 No. 2, January 1991, p. 339.

Retour vers la note de texte 6853

48

Margaret Moore, “Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession”, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 5.

Retour vers la note de texte 6923

50

Arthur S. Link (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 45, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984.

Retour vers la note de texte 6854

51

Alan Patten, “Democratic Secession from a Multinational State”, Ethics, Vol. 112 No. 3, April 2002, p. 558-559.

Retour vers la note de texte 6855

52

Allen Lynch, “Woodrow Wilson and the principle of ‘national self-determination’: a reconsideration”, Review of International Studies, No. 28, 2002, p. 419-436.

Retour vers la note de texte 6856

53

See for examples Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 2, January 1991, p. 328-329; Alan Patten, “Democratic Secession from a Multinational State, Ethics, Vol. 112, No. 3, April 2002, p. 558-559.

Retour vers la note de texte 6857

54

Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 2, January 1991, p. 328-329.

Retour vers la note de texte 6859

55

Joshua Castellino, “Order and Justice: National Minorities and the Right to Secession”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, No. 6, 1999, p. 404-405. See the clarification of my use of the phrase “ethnic identity” in the last three paragraphs of the second main section titled “Conceptualising ‘Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups’ and ‘Ethnic Identity’ in the Kenyan Context”.

 

Retour vers la note de texte 7059

56

Metta Spencer, Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

Retour vers la note de texte 6858

57

Alan Patten, “Democratic Secession from a Multinational State, Ethics, Vol. 112, No. 3, April 2002, p. 569.

Retour vers la note de texte 6860

58

Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 112-113.

Retour vers la note de texte 6861

59

Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, Boston, Beacon Press, 1963, p. 56.

Retour vers la note de texte 6862

60

Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 2, January 1991, p. 329.

Retour vers la note de texte 6863

61

D.A. Masolo, “Narrative and Experience of Community as Philosophy of Culture”, Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya, Premier Issue, New Series, Vol.1 No.1, June 2009, p. 53-55.

Retour vers la note de texte 6864

62

Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, Vol. 10, No. 2, January 1991, p. 329.

Retour vers la note de texte 6865

63

Margaret Moore, “Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession”, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 3-4.

Retour vers la note de texte 6866

64

Christopher H. Wellman, “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 1995, p. 142.

Retour vers la note de texte 6867

65

Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 2, January 1995, p.366.

 

Retour vers la note de texte 6868

66

Ahmed Nasir M. Abdullahi, “Winding up the State: Why African States Should Legislate Secession as a Constitutional Right for Ethnic Nationalities”, in Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Kivutha Kibwana, Chris Maina Peter (eds.), Law and the Struggle for Democracy in East Africa, Nairobi, Claripress, 1996, p. 372.

Retour vers la note de texte 6869

67

Lee Cronk, From Mukogodo to Maasai: Ethnicity and Cultural Change in Kenya, Oxford, Westview Press, 2004.

Retour vers la note de texte 6870

68

Bruno Coppieters, “Conclusion: Just War Theory and the Ethics of Secession”, in Bruno Coppieters, Richard Sakwa (eds.), Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 273.

Retour vers la note de texte 6872

69

Allen Buchanan, “Democracy and Secession”, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 25.

Retour vers la note de texte 6871

70

Michelle Seymour, “Secession as a Remedial Right”, Inquiry, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2007, p. 419-420.

Retour vers la note de texte 6873

71

Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 2, January 1991, p. 329-330.

Retour vers la note de texte 6874

72

Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 2, January 1995, p.376.

Retour vers la note de texte 6875

73

Wanyiri Kihoro, The Price of Freedom: The Story of Political Resistance in Kenya, Nairobi, Mvule Africa Publishers, 2005, p. 8.

Retour vers la note de texte 6876

74

James R. Brennan, “Lowering the Sultan’s Flag: Sovereignty and Decolonization in Coastal Kenya”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 50, No 4, 2008, p. 831-861.

Retour vers la note de texte 6877

75

Osaak Olumwullah, “Government”, in William R. Ochieng’ (ed.), Themes in Kenyan History, Nairobi, East African Educational Publishers, 1990, p. 88; Fred Jonyo, “Ethnicity in Multi Party Electoral Politics”. In Ludeki Chweya (ed.), Electoral Politics in Kenya, Nairobi, Claripress, 2002, p. 90.

Retour vers la note de texte 6878

76

Ken Omolo, “Political Ethnicity in the Democratisation Process in Kenya”, African Studies, Vol. 61 No. 2, 2002, p. 213.

Retour vers la note de texte 6879

77

James R. Brennan, “Lowering the Sultan’s Flag: Sovereignty and Decolonization in Coastal Kenya”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 50, No 4, 2008, p. 831.

 

Retour vers la note de texte 6882

80

John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Thomas P. Peardon (ed.), Ed. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1960 [1689], p. 99.

Retour vers la note de texte 6883

81

Adams Oloo, “Minority Rights and Transition Politics”, in Peter Wanyande, Mary Omosa and Ludeki Chweya (eds.), Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya, Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2007, p. 206-207.

Retour vers la note de texte 6885

83

Reginald M.J. Oduor, Ethnic Minorities in Kenya’s Emerging Democracy: Philosophical Foundations of their Liberties and Limits, Ph.D. thesis at the University of Nairobi, 2011, p. 156.

Retour vers la note de texte 6924

84

NCIC (National Cohesion and Integration Commission), First Ethnic Audit of the Kenya Civil Service, Nairobi, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, 2011.

Retour vers la note de texte 6886

85

NCIC (National Cohesion and Integration Commission), Towards national cohesion and unity in Kenya: Ethnic diversity and audit of the civil service, volume 1, Nairobi, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, 2012.

Retour vers la note de texte 6888

86

KHRC (Kenya Human Rights Commission), Ethnicity and Politicization in Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2018, p. 24. See, for examples, the representation of various ethnic groups in Jomo Kenyatta’s cabinets from 1963 to 1978 (KHRC 2018, 23), and in Daniel arap Moi’s cabinets from 1978 to 2001.

Retour vers la note de texte 6887

87

Cited in KHRC (Kenya Human Rights Commission), Ethnicity and Politicization in Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2018, p. 24.

Retour vers la note de texte 6889

88

Kibiwott Koross, “Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto Strongholds Hog Half of Public Jobs”, The Saturday Standard, 18 January 2014, accessed 16 February 2017.

Retour vers la note de texte 6890

90

Anyang’ Nyong’o, “Mr President, Central Bank of Kenya Appointments Indicate Ethnic Balance Lacking”. The Sunday Standard, 7 June 2015, accessed 3 February 2017.

Retour vers la note de texte 6925

92

Reginald M. J. Oduor, “Nationhood and Statehood: The Impact of a Conflated Discourse on African Polities and their Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups”, Utafiti: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 13 No. 2, 2018, p. 45-66.

Retour vers la note de texte 6927

93

Reginald M. J. Oduor, “Liberal Democracy: An African Critique”, South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 1, p. 108-122, 2019.

 

Retour vers la note de texte 6926

95

John Kamau, The Ogiek: The Ongoing Destruction of a Minority Tribe in Kenya, Nairobi, Rights News and Features Service, 2000. Cf. www.ogiek.org;

 

 

Sengwer representatives, “New Constitution is the Only Hope for Ethnic Minorities”, Memorandum from the Sengwer of Kenya, Presented to the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission on 10th July 2002;

 

 

Lee Cronk, From Mukogodo to Maasai: Ethnicity and Cultural Change in Kenya, Oxford, Westview Press, 2004.

 

 

Korir Sing’Oei Abraham, “The Endorois Of Kenya: From Non-Beneficiaries To Active Stakeholders”, 2010.

Retour vers la note de texte 6898

96

Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics, Vol. 105 No. 2, January 1995, p. 378; Christopher H. Wellman, “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 1995, p. 156.

 

Retour vers la note de texte 6899

97

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Forme & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill, A.R. Waller (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1904, p. 156.

Retour vers la note de texte 6900

98

Africa Watch, Kenya: Taking Liberties, London, Africa Watch, 1991.

Retour vers la note de texte 6901

99

Ahmed Nasir M. Abdullahi, “Winding up the State: Why African States Should Legislate Secession as a Constitutional Right for Ethnic Nationalities”, in Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Kivutha Kibwana, Chris Maina Peter (eds.), Law and the Struggle for Democracy in East Africa, Nairobi, Claripress, 1996, p. 374.

Retour vers la note de texte 6902

100

Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 2, January 1991, p. 330-331.

Retour vers la note de texte 6903

101

Quoted in Mwakera Mwajefa, “Minister pushes for secession of Coast”, Daily Nation, Monday, 11th May, 2009.

Retour vers la note de texte 6928

102

I see no essential difference between secession and decolonisation: the former colonies broke away from the imperial states to which they had been subjugated in the same way that secession typically occurs. For example, I see no essential difference between the independence of Sudan from Anglo-Egyptian colonialism in 1956, and that of the Republic of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011.

Retour vers la note de texte 6907

103

Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics, Vol. 105 No. 2, January 1995, p.381-382.

Retour vers la note de texte 6908

104

Reginald M.J. Oduor, Ethnic Minorities in Kenya’s Emerging Democracy: Philosophical Foundations of their Liberties and Limits, Ph.D. thesis at the University of Nairobi, 2011, p. 292-305.

Retour vers la note de texte 6909

105

Christopher H. Wellman, “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 1995, p. 157-158, p. 171.

Retour vers la note de texte 6910

106

Michael Walzer, “The Reform of the International System”, in Oyvind Osterud (ed.), Studies of War and Peace, Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1996, p. 227-239.

 

Retour vers la note de texte 6911

107

Ahmed Nasir M. Abdullahi, “Winding up the State: Why African States Should Legislate Secession as a Constitutional Right for Ethnic Nationalities”, in Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Kivutha Kibwana, Chris Maina Peter (eds.), Law and the Struggle for Democracy in East Africa, Nairobi, Claripress, 1996, p. 373-374.

Retour vers la note de texte 6912

108

Ahmed Nasir M. Abdullahi, “Winding up the State: Why African States Should Legislate Secession as a Constitutional Right for Ethnic Nationalities”, in Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Kivutha Kibwana, Chris Maina Peter (eds.), Law and the Struggle for Democracy in East Africa, Nairobi, Claripress, 1996, p. 384.

Retour vers la note de texte 6913

109

Cass R. Sunstein, “Constitutionalism and Secession”, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 634.

Retour vers la note de texte 6914

110

Cass R. Sunstein, “Constitutionalism and Secession”, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 635.

Retour vers la note de texte 6915

111

Allen Buchanan, “Democracy and Secession”, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1998.

Retour vers la note de texte 6929

112

Cass R. Sunstein, “Constitutionalism and Secession”, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 650.

 

Retour vers la note de texte 6917

114

Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics, Vol. 105 No. 2, January 1995, p. 377-378.

Retour vers la note de texte 6918

115

Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics, Vol. 105 No. 2, January 1995, p. 381-382.

Retour vers la note de texte 7060

116

Metta Spencer, Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

Retour vers la note de texte 6919

117

Allen Buchanan, Democracy and Secession”, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 14.

Retour vers la note de texte 6920

118

Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 2, January 1995, p. 352-385.

Retour vers la note de texte 7062

119

Thomas O. Ojanga, Letter to the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review, 2009. www.coek.org

Retour vers la note de texte 6921

120

Reginald M.J. Oduor, Ethnic Minorities in Kenya’s Emerging Democracy: Philosophical Foundations of their Liberties and Limits, Ph.D. thesis at the University of Nairobi, 2011, p. 365-348.

Retour vers la note de texte 6922

121

Reginald M. J. Oduor, “In Defence of Ethnically-based Federations in Post-Colonial African States, with Special Reference to Kenya”, Presented on 23rd May, 2017 at 2:00 p.m., at an international conference titled “Beyond Liberal Democracy: The Quest for Indigenous African Models of Democracy for the Twenty-First Century”, University Towers, University of Nairobi, Kenya, organised by the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Nairobi and the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., 22nd to 23rd May, 2017.

Philip Abbott, “Utopian Problem-Solving: ’The Great Divorce’ and the Secession Question”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 2, May 2000, p. 511-533.

 

Ahmed Nasir M. Abdullahi, “Winding up the State: Why African States Should Legislate Secession as a Constitutional Right for Ethnic Nationalities”, in Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Kivutha Kibwana, Chris Maina Peter (eds.), Law and the Struggle for Democracy in East Africa, Nairobi, Claripress, 1996, p. 372-390.

Africa Watch, Kenya: Taking Liberties, London, Africa Watch, 1991.

Claude Ake, “What is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa?”, Transformation, No. 22, 1993.

Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Harry Beran, “A Liberal Theory of Secession”, Political Studies, No. 32, March 1984, p. 21-31.

Olivier Boehme, “The Involvement of the Belgian Central Bank in the Katanga Secession, 1960-1963”, African Economic History, No. 33, 2005, p. 1-29.

James R. Brennan, “Lowering the Sultan’s Flag: Sovereignty and Decolonization in Coastal Kenya”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 50 No 4, 2008, p. 831-861.

Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of Secession”, Ethics, Vol. 101 No. 2, January 1991, p. 322-342.

Allen Buchanan, “Democracy and Secession”, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998.

Allen Buchanan, “Secession”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017.

Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, New York, United Nations, Center for Human Rights, Geneva, 1991.

Joshua Castellino, “Order and Justice: National Minorities and the Right to Secession”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, No. 6, 1999, p. 389-415.

Bruno Coppieters, “Introduction”, in Bruno Coppieters, Richard Sakwa (eds.), Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 1-21.

Bruno Coppieters, “Conclusion: Just War Theory and the Ethics of Secession”, in Bruno Coppieters, Richard Sakwa (eds.), Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 252 ff.

 

Lee Cronk, From Mukogodo to Maasai: Ethnicity and Cultural Change in Kenya, Oxford, Westview Press, 2004.

John Crowley, “The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, January 2001, p. 99-121.

Yash Ghai, “Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis“, in Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 1-26.

Cressida Heyes, "Identity Politics", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2018 Edition.

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Forme & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill, A.R. Waller (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1904.

Richard Jenkins, Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations, London, SAGE Publications, 1997.

Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, Boston, Beacon Press, 1963.

Fred Jonyo, “Ethnicity in Multi Party Electoral Politics”, in Ludeki Chweya (ed.), Electoral Politics in Kenya, Nairobi, Claripress, 2002, p. 86-107.

John Kamau, The Ogiek: The Ongoing Destruction of a Minority Tribe in Kenya, Nairobi, Rights News and Features Service, 2000. www.ogiek.org

Karuti Kanyinga, “Governance Institutions and Inequality in Kenya”, in Society for International Development, Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives, Nairobi, Society for International Development, 2006, p. 345-397.

James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Second Edition, London, Macmillan Press, 1998.

Bonny Khalwale, “List of Uhuru Kenyatta’s Tribal Appointments into Top Government Jobs”, 2015. Accessed 16 February 2017.

KHRC (Kenya Human Rights Commission), Ethnicity and Politicization in Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2018.

Wanyiri Kihoro, The Price of Freedom: The Story of Political Resistance in Kenya, Nairobi, Mvule Africa Publishers, 2005.

Kibiwott Koross, “Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto Strongholds Hog Half of Public Jobs”, The Saturday Standard, 18 January 2014. Accessed 15 February 2017.

Carola Lentz, “‘Tribalism’ and Ethnicity in Africa”, Cahiers des Sciences Humaines, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1995, p. 303-328.

Arthur S. Link, (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 45, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984.

John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Thomas P. Peardon (ed.), Ed. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1960 [1689].

Allen Lynch, “Woodrow Wilson and the principle of ‘national self-determination’: a reconsideration”, Review of International Studies, No. 28, 2002, p. 419-436.

Gabrielle Lynch, 2006, “Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya”, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 107, March 2006, p. 49-65.

Archie Mafeje, “The Ideology of ‘Tribalism’”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 9 no. 2, 1971, p. 253-261.

D.A. Masolo, “Narrative and Experience of Community as Philosophy of Culture”, Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya, Premier Issue, New Series, Vol.1, No.1, June 2009, p. 43-68.

Margaret Moore, “Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession”, in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 1-13.

Lawrence M. Mute, “Minority Groups and the Constitutional Review Process”, in Lawrence M. Mute, Wanjala Smokin (eds.), When the Constitution Begins to Flower: Paradigms for Constitutional Change in Kenya, Volume 1, Nairobi, Claripress, 2002, p. 144-184.

Mwakera Mwajefa, “Minister pushes for secession of Coast”, Daily Nation, Monday, 11th May, 2009.

NCIC (National Cohesion and Integration Commission), First Ethnic Audit of the Kenya Civil Service, Nairobi, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, 2011.

NCIC (National Cohesion and Integration Commission), Towards National Cohesion and Unity in Kenya: Ethnic Diversity and Audit of the Civil Service, volume 1, Nairobi, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, 2012.

Stephen N. Ndegwa, “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91 No. 3, 1997, p. 599-616.

Stephen N. Ndegwa, Kenya: Third Time Lucky?”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3, July 2003, p. 145-158.

David Ndii, “Kenya is a Cruel Marriage: It’s Time We Talk Divorce”, Saturday Nation, 26th March 2016.

 

Anyang’ Nyong’o, “Mr President, Central Bank of Kenya Appointments Indicate Ethnic Balance Lacking”, The Sunday Standard, 7 June 2015. Accessed 3 February 2017.

Reginald M.J. Oduor, Ethnic Minorities in Kenya’s Emerging Democracy: Philosophical Foundations of their Liberties and Limits, Ph.D. thesis at the University of Nairobi, 2011.

Reginald M.J. Oduor, “In Defence of Ethnically-based Federations in Post-Colonial African States, with Special Reference to Kenya”. Presented on 23rd May, 2017 at 2:00 p.m., at an international conference titled “Beyond Liberal Democracy: The Quest for Indigenous African Models of Democracy for the Twenty-First Century”, University Towers, University of Nairobi, Kenya, organised by the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Nairobi and the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., 22nd to 23rd May, 2017.

 

Reginald M.J. Oduor, “Nationhood and Statehood: The Impact of a Conflated Discourse on African Polities and their Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups”, Utafiti: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 13 No. 2, 2018, p. 45-66.

Reginald M.J. Oduor, “Liberal Democracy: An African Critique”, South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 1, p. 108-122, 2019.

Thomas O. Ojanga, Letter to the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review, 2009.

D. Okoth Okombo, “Language and Ethnic Identity: The Case of the Abasuba”, CEES Seminar Papers No.1, Presented at the Launching of the Faculty of Education, University of Nairobi, Staff/Student Seminars on 7th November, 1996.

Adams Oloo, “Minority Rights and Transition Politics”, in Peter Wanyande, Mary Omosa and Ludeki Chweya (eds.), Governance and Transition Politics in Kenya. Nairobi, University of Nairobi Press, 2007, p. 179-213.

Osaak Olumwullah, “Government”, in William R. Ochieng’ (ed.), Themes in Kenyan History, Nairobi, East African Educational Publishers, p. 88-116, 1990.

Ken Omolo, 2002, “Political Ethnicity in the Democratisation Process in Kenya”, African Studies, Vol. 61 No. 2, p. 209-221.

 

Walter O. Oyugi, “Ethnicity In The Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections In Kenya”, African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No.1, 1997, p. 41-69.

Walter O. Oyugi, "Ethnic Relations and the Democratisation Process in Kenya: 1990-1997", in, Okwudiba Nnoli, (ed.), Ethnic Conflict in Africa, Dakar, CODESRIA, 1998.

Walter O. Oyugi, “The Politics of Transition in Kenya, 1992-2003: Democratic Consolidation or Deconsolidation?, in Walter O. Oyugi, P. Wanyande, C. Odhiambo-Mbai (eds.), The Politics of Transition in Kenya: from KANU to NARC, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2003, p.345-381.

Alan Patten, “Democratic Secession from a Multinational State”, Ethics, Vol. 112 No. 3, April 2002, p. 558-586.

Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics, Vol. 105 No. 2, January 1995, p. 352-385.

Republic of Kenya, Kenya Population Census, 1989, Vol.1, Nairobi, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1994.

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Richard Schermerhorn, “Ethnicity and Minority Groups”, in Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 17-18.

Sengwer representatives, “New Constitution is the Only Hope for Ethnic Minorities”, Memorandum from the Sengwer of Kenya, Presented to the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission on 10th July 2002.

Kalundi Serumaga, “SPEAK OF ME AS I AM: Ethiopia, Native Identities and the National Question in Africa”, The E Review, 26th January 2019.

Michelle Seymour, “Secession as a Remedial Right”, Inquiry, Vol. 50 No. 4, 2007, p. 395 - 423.

Metta Spencer, Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield,1998.

Cass R. Sunstein, “Constitutionalism and Secession”, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 633-670.

Michael Walzer, “The Reform of the International System”, in Oyvind Osterud (ed.), Studies of War and Peace, Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1996.

Grace Wekesa, “President Uhuru Kenyatta Appointed People from only two Communities to Public Jobs, Says Wetang’ula”, The Sunday Standard, 20 March 2016, accessed 16 February 2017.

Christopher H. Wellman, “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 1995, p. 142-171.

Christopher H. Wellman, “Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation”, Ethics, Vol. 111, No. 4, July 2001, p. 735-759.

Michella Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat, London, Fourth Estate, 2009.

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Femmes, genre et sciences sociales

Les entretiens et l'article présentés ici proposent une pluralité de méthodes pour l'étude du genre en sciences sociales, via des disciplines et des contextes différents (le travail, la politique, la guerre). Ils ont pour point commun leur effort exemplaire de réflexivité. Ils mettent en évidence le fait que l'étude du genre est une condition prioritaire de compréhension de l'ensemble des processus sociaux et historiques étudiés par les sciences sociales du politique.

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Faire des sciences sociales

Guidés par quelques intuitions et armés de leur réflexivité, les chercheurs en sciences sociales construisent leurs objets, élaborent des dispositifs d'enquête, interprètent les données de terrain. La démarche scientifique est ainsi une contribution à l'interprétation du monde.

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Sciences sociales et migrations

Au cœur de l’actualité, enjeux publics et politiques majeurs mais aussi objets de débats et d’instrumentalisations sans cesse renouvelées, les migrations se sont depuis longtemps imposées à l’attention des chercheurs en sciences sociales. En témoignent ici l’histoire comparée des mouvements migratoires défendue par Nancy Green, l’approche ethnographique des zones frontalières par Chowra Makaremi, et l’analyse des migrations contraintes dans les espaces soviétique par Catherine Goussef.